

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND
CIVILIZATION (ISTAC)

FAKHR AL-DIN AL-RAZI'S LOGIC : AN EDITION OF HIS
MULAKHKHAS FI AL-HIKMAH WA AL-MANTIQ
(SECTION ON TASAWWURAT AND AL-HADD)
TOGETHER WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC
THOUGHT AND CIVILIZATION (ISTAC)
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE M.A. DEGREE

BY
MOHD FARID MOHD SHAHRAN

KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA
SEPTEMBER 1999



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	v
ABSTRACT.....	vii

CHAPTER ONE

FAKHR AL-DĪN AL-RĀZĪ AND LOGIC.....	1
1. Introduction.....	1
2. Logic during al-Rāzī's Times	3
A. Two Schools of Logic.....	4
B. Logic and the Religious Sciences.....	7
3. His Logical and Philosophical Tendencies.....	10
4. His Place in and Contributions to Logic.....	14
5. His Logical Writings.....	16
6. Conclusion.....	22

CHAPTER TWO

THE ANALYSIS OF KITĀB *AL-MULAKHKHAŞ FĪ AL-HIKMAH WA AL-MANTIQ*

1. The Descriptions of the Manuscripts.....	23
2. Notes for Editing.....	24
3. The Content.....	25
4. The Analysis of the Text.....	27
A. Introduction.....	28
I. The Need for Logic.....	28
II. Subject Matter of Logic.....	28

B. First Division: The Principles (*al-Mabādi'*)

Chapter 1: General Overview of the Discussion.....	29
Chapter 2: Correspondence, Implication and Correlation.....	31
Chapter 3: Singular and Composite.....	33
Chapter 4: Universal and Particular.....	34
Chapter 5: Quiddity.....	36
Chapter 6: Parts of Quiddity.....	38
Chapter 7: External Concomitants.....	43
Chapter 8: Genus.....	46
Chapter 9: Species.....	47
Chapter 10: Issues Common to Genus and Species.....	49
Chapter 11: Differentia.....	50
Chapter 12: Property.....	54
Chapter 13: Common Accident.....	55
Chapter 14: Modes of Constructing the Five Universals.....	55

Second Division: The Objectives: The Discussion of Definition and Description

Chapter 1: Classification of Definition.....	60
Chapter 2: The Division of a Quiddity with Respect to the Essential Definition (<i>al-Hadd</i>).....	61
Chapter 3: On the Conceivable Elements.....	61
Chapter 4: On the Fact that Not Everyone Who Defines Something by Mentioning the Parts Has Defined it by Essential Definition (<i>al-Hadd</i>).....	62
Chapter 5: On the Fact that Essential Definition is Not Acquired by Proof.....	62

Chapter 6: On the Fact that Addition (<i>Ziyādah</i>) to Definition (<i>Ḥadḥ</i>) is Not Possible but such is Possible with Description.....	63
Chapter 7: The Relation between Essential Definition and Descriptive Definition.....	63
Chapter 8: Critique of Essential Definition and Descriptive Definition.....	64
Chapter 9: Whether Composing a Definition is Difficult or Not.....	65

CHAPTER THREE

THE EDITION OF THE ARABIC TEXT OF <i>KITĀB AL-MULAKKHAṢ FĪ AL-ḤIKMAH</i>	67
Selected Bibliography.....	140

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ABSTRACT

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī is known throughout the history of Islamic thought as a theologian *par excellence*. Writers of Islamic history and civilization will always regard him as one pearl in the Ash'arite chain of outstanding theologians alongside other great names such as al-Juwaynī, al-Baḳillānī, and al-Ghazālī. In many intellectual accounts, his originality will be closely associated with two of his masterpieces, the theological work *Muḥaṣṣal* and his theological exegesis of the Holy Qur'ān *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb*. There is no doubt that his significance in theology is due to his mastery of the philosophical sciences, particularly logic, a field that is very much connected--in fact, preliminary--to theology. Bearing this important fact in mind, this study attempts to introduce the logical spectrum of al-Rāzī's intellectualism. First, it discusses the historical development of logic in the time prior to al-Rāzī, concentrating on the two existing schools of logic and the disharmony between logic and other religious sciences. It further evaluates the contribution of al-Rāzī in shaping the logical atmosphere, especially in the second half of the twelfth century. In so doing, the influence of logic particularly on al-Rāzī's works in various fields is critically examined. Also important is the instrumental basis which influenced his logical approach. It is followed by a survey of the vast number of his logical writings which are divided into three main classes; to wit, his own exposition on logic, his critical commentaries on Ibn Sīnā's writings on logic, and his logical discourse which acts as a preliminary to his theological writings.

This study will also include an edition of the *al-taṣawwūrāt* part of logic, in al-Rāzī's work *Kitāb al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī al-Ḥikmah wa al-Manṭiq*. This edited part pertains mainly to elements that are indispensable for constructing definitions such as kinds of

terms and their relation with meanings, concomitants, quiddity, parts of quiddity, and the five universals (genus, species, differentia, property and common accidents). This part on concepts ends with a discussion of the problems in definition. To facilitate the understanding of this edited part, a summary of its contents is also provided.

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ

CHAPTER ONE

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Logic

1. Introduction

Some scholars have claimed that the fundamental elements or constituents of logic as a discipline of study are of Greek--or strictly speaking, Aristotelian--origin. Even if such a hypothesis will later turn out to be an established fact, these rudiments have been modified--where appropriate--and further developed by the Muslim philosophers and logicians in accordance with the Islamic worldview and scientific scheme. In line with a view that logic is merely a scientific instrument, as held by the majority of Muslims, one can still argue that most of its terms need not be changed because of its neutrality and universality. However, in so far as its treatment in the Islamic intellectual tradition is concerned, these terms, as strongly argued by Shehadi, seem to have been treated differently in many respects.¹ Perhaps, this is what is meant by Rescher when he claims, while describing the great contribution of the early Muslim logicians to the development of logic, that "starting from the 10th century, Greek logic was not only Arabicized, but also Islamized."²

As a matter of fact, the attempt to bring logic nearer to Islam was realized when Muslim scholars started to apply it to the so-called religious sciences such as *kalām* (Islamic theology) and *uṣūl al-fiqh* (principles of Islamic jurisprudence). This attempt was made possible by the strong defence and appreciation of logic by the

¹ Fadlou Shehadi, "The Continuity in Greek-Islamic Philosophy," in *Arabic Philosophy and the West*, ed. Therese-Anne Druart (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University, 1988), 19-25.

² Nicholas Rescher, *The Development of Arabic Logic* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), 15. Hereinafter cited as *Development*.

former *mutakallimūn* (Muslim theologians) against some other traditional scholars who still viewed logic as an alien science and, thus as unfit for the Islamic tradition. Among those who have defended logic and utilized it optimally in the religious sciences is Imām Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, one of the most celebrated scholars in the history of the Islamic intellectual tradition and with whom our study will be mainly concerned.

Abū al-Faḍl Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar, known as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī³ (1149-1209 A.C.) was a famous *mutakallim*. His fame and prominence rest not only on his encyclopaedic knowledge, but also on his critical appreciation of the works of other scholars, particularly Ibn Sīnā, which has earned him the title *Imām al-Mushakkikūn* (The Head of Doubters). Al-Rāzī has written on various subjects ranging from fields as important as metaphysics, theology, philosophy, exegesis, jurisprudence and history to the less important ones such as physiognomy (*‘ilm al-firāsāt*), magic (*siḥr*), stars (*‘ilm al-nujūm*), and even drinks (*al-ashribah*). Zarkān, in his extensive survey of al-Rāzī’s works and ideas, has recorded 149 titles attributed to him.⁴

Notwithstanding this fact, the studies on al-Rāzī thus far still remain small in number and mostly confined to theology and Quranic exegesis (*tafsīr*).⁵ Other aspects

³ For his biography, see Yasin Ceylan, *Theology and Tafsīr in the Major Works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī* (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1996), 1-13; Salih Zarkān, *Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī wa ‘Arā’uhū al-Kalāmiyyah wa al-Falsafiyah* (Egypt: Dārul Fikr, 1963), 8-36, hereinafter cited as *Fakhr al-Dīn*. Introduction by Muḥammad al-Mu’tasim billah al-Baghādātī in al-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqiyyah* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 1990), 11-27; Introduction of M. Saghir Ḥasan Ma’sūmī, *Imām Rāzī’s ‘Ilm al-Akhlāq* (Pakistan: Islamic Research Institute, 1985), 1-29, hereinafter cited as *Akhlāq*. The best classical sources for his biography are: Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘ah, *Uyūn al-Anbā’*; Ibn al-Qiflī, *Tārīkh al-Hukamā’*; Ibn Khallikān, *Kitāb Wafayāt al-A‘yān*, Shams al-Dīn Shahrastūrī, *Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ wa Rawdat al-Ajrah* and Taḥṣīl al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Tabaqāt al-Shāfi‘iyyah al-Kubrā*.

⁴ Ṣāliḥ Zarkān, *Fakhr al-Dīn*, 62-153. His list, though it includes the spurious titles attributed to al-Rāzī, is mostly based on the authoritative bibliographical sources such as al-Qiflī, *Akhhār al-Hukamā’*, Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A‘yān*, al-Subkī, *Tabaqāt al-Shāfi‘iyyah*, Ḥajī Khalīfah, *Kashf al-Zunūn*, al-Ṣafādī *al-Wāfi‘ al-Wafayāt* and others. See also another classification of Rāzī’s works in Brockelmann, *Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur*, translated into Arabic under the title *Tārīkh al-‘Adāb al-‘Arabī*, by ‘Abd Halīm al-Najjār (Cairo: n.p., 1961), 227.

⁵ The existing studies on al-Rāzī so far are the book of Yasin Ceylan, *Theology and Tafsīr in the Major Works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī* (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1996); Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī,” *History of Muslim Philosophy*, ed. and intro. M. M. Sharif (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), 1:642-656. Other specific research is the work of Fathalla Kholeif. *A Study on*

of his thought and contributions have been relatively ignored. For instance, his works on logic such as *al-Manṭiq al-Kabīr* and *Mulakhkhaṣ fi al-Ḥikmah wa al-Manṭiq*, despite their significance and value, have been almost untouched. Therefore, as an attempt to fill such an intellectual vacuum, this study will concern itself mainly with al-Rāzī's treatment of logic by providing a summary of the contents of his logical works, within a survey that investigates into his background. Moreover the section on logic from his *Kitāb al-Mulakhkhaṣ fi al-Ḥikmah wa al-Manṭiq*, will be made available for the first time to the world of knowledge with our critical edition of its original Arabic text.

2. Logic during Al-Rāzī's Times

In order to understand better al-Rāzī's stand on logic, it is important to glance through the historical setting of his period, particularly the development of logical studies during the 12th and the 13th centuries. In general, the century of al-Rāzī (12th century) is viewed as the beginning of the productive period of Arabic logic, despite all the political turmoils and great religious wars that took place.⁶ There were at least two important historical factors that influenced al-Rāzī's logical studies: the prevalent schools of logic of his time, and the position of logic vis-à-vis the religio-traditional sciences:

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and His Controversies in Transoxiana (Beirut: Dārul Mashriq, 1984). There are also a few writings in Arabic such as Ṣāliḥ Zarkān, *Fakhr al-Dīn*, Muhammad Al-'Uraybi, *al-Munṭalaqāt al-Fikriyyah 'inda al-Imām al-Fakhr al-Rāzī* (Beirut: Dārul Fikr al-Lubnāni, 1992).

⁶ The century in which al-Rāzī lived (12th century) is considered as the weakening and downfall period of the 'Abbasid caliphate in particular and the Islamic political system in general. Apart from the corruption of the rulers and authorities, the period also witnessed several crusades (second and third) taking place. Another contributive factor to the downfall is the increasing power of the Moghul in the Islamic empire which also affected the administration of the Islamic caliphate. In contrast to this political deterioration, there was, however, a positive development in the intellectual sphere. Apart from logic and philosophy, there was a rise in other disciplines such as sufism and theology. Among the scholars who were contemporaries of al-Rāzī were Ibn Rushd, Ibn Tufayl, Suhrawardī, Shahrastānī, Ibn 'Arabī, Farīd al-Dīn 'Aṭṭār, 'Abd Qādir Jīlānī, Ibn Farīd, Ibn Maimūn, Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī, and 'Izz al-Dīn 'Abd Salām.

A. Two Schools of Logic

At the beginning of the second half of the 12th century, the development of logic in the Muslim world had already reached its peak.⁷ In general, there were two influential logical schools at that time; that of Baghdad and that of the Easterners' (*Mashriqiyyūn*). Concentrating chiefly on commentaries, the former school was strictly Aristotelian in its tone, and was dominated initially by the Christian Syriac, especially the Nestorian Arabs. It only achieved its glory after the emergence of al-Fārābī, one of the great logicians of Islam.⁸ He was one of the famous masters of the logicians (*ra'īs al-mantiqiyyīn*), a title which was given to the bearer of academic excellence in the Baghdad school. He contributed a lot to the development of logic in this logical school especially by devoting most of his efforts to commenting the *Organon* of his master Aristotle. The contributions of al-Fārābī in translating and commenting on the Greek logic are truly tremendous and are essential to the Islamic intellectual tradition. For this reason, this particular period is called by Rescher the "first step of the flowering period of Arabic logic."⁹ Nevertheless, this school was still preoccupied with strict, direct textual commentaries on the Greek logical texts¹⁰ and was also closely associated with the medical field.¹¹

⁷ Rescher, *Development*, 55.

⁸ For Al-Fārābī's logic, see Al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-'Alfāz al-Musta'malah fī'l-Mantiq*, ed. Muhsin Mahdi (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1968); Rafiq 'Ajam, *al-Mantiq 'inda al-Fārābī* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1986); Fuad Said Haddad, *Al-Fārābī's Theory of Communication* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1984).

⁹ Rescher, *Development*, 47.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 27. There are nine Aristotelian works, all of which were translated into Arabic, together with the Introduction of Porphyry. The nine canonical texts are well-known as: Introduction (*al-Isaghūjī*), Categories (*al-Maqūlāt*), Hermeneutics/De Interpretatione (*al-'Ibārāh*), Prior Analytics (*al-Qiyās*), Posterior Analytics/Apodictics (*al-Burhān*), Topics (*al-Jadal*), Sophistics (*al-Mughālahah*), Rhetoric (*al-Khiṭābah*) and Poetics (*al-Shi'r*). These also represent the nine distinct branches of logic, each one based upon its canonical text. Among them, only the first four became the main concern of this school, while the others were considered unimportant and left to the experts to deal with. Upon these early works, neither commentaries nor critiques have been made, particularly because they were translated not by the experts of logic but mere translators. The translations were unrefined and interlaced with transliterated Greek terms which did not yield a smoothly intelligible Arabic text. Furthermore, logical works at that time were translated as an act of piety rather than out of an interest in its content. These Greek logical works are still the subject of studies and research until today. However, in the modern studies on medieval logic, only six are their concern, namely excluding the last two, rhetorics and poetics as well as the introduction. The reason for this is that

As to the school of the Easterners, the towering figure was the great logician of Islam, Ibn Sīnā, whose logical ideas have influenced tremendously the whole discussions of logic in the Muslim world.¹² Ibn Sīnā's system of logic, though not totally free from the Greek influence,¹³ can be seen in general as a shift of direction in the development of Arabic logic. Compared to the strict, logical commentators of the Baghdad School, he is rather independent in his approach as Goodman points out as follows:

Avicenna made logic an independent study, no longer tightly bound to the Aristotelian texts but capable of expansion and development on its own in the Islamic context. The outcome was fraught with significance.¹⁴

His independent treatment of logic in both systematization and content is already obvious in his major works, *al-Shifā'*, *al-Najāt*, *al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt* and *Dānesh-Nāma-yi-'Alā'ī*. One of the most important aspects of his analysis of logic, which actually influenced tremendously the later developments of logic, is the division of knowledge into concepts (*taṣawwurāt*) and judgements (*taṣdiqāt*). In addition to that, the chronological order of topics in his later writings such as *Ishārāt*,

the last two are not considered as strictly the demonstrative goals of modern logic. See further Deborah L. Black, *Logic and Aristotles' Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), 1-4.

¹¹ This close association between logic and medical studies in this period interestingly is said to be motivated by the statement of Galen that 'the study of mathematics and logic is a precondition for the intelligent comprehension of medical books', Rescher, *Development*, 16.

¹² For Ibn Sīnā's discussions on logic, see Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Shifā'*; *al-Manṭiq*, ed. Abd. Ḥamid Sobruḥ (Iran: Manshūrāt Ayāt Allah al-'Uzmā, 1984); *Dānesh-Nāma-yi 'Alā'ī*. Part One, trans. and intro. Farhang Zabeeh, *Avicenna's Treatise in Logic* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971); *Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt*, 3 vols., ed. Sulaymān Dunyā, (Cairo: n.p., 1947); Shams Constantine Inati, *Remarks and Admonitions: Part One; Logic* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984); Bilal Kuspinar, "Ibn Sīnā's Theory of Logic" (M.A. thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 1987).

¹³ It is common for Muslim philosophers to benefit from the previous heritage especially in the instrumental sciences like logic. Ibn Sīnā, in this case, combines the approach of Aristotle and the Stoics with critical analysis and assessment. Soheil Afnān, while elaborating this matter, states, "Ibn Sīnā really combines the two, not by a mechanical superimposition of one on the other, but via a critical assessment of the two doctrines, with a good measure of simplification and perfecting on his part." Soheil Afnān, *Avicenna, his Life and Works* (London: George Allan & Unwin Ltd., 1958), 88.

¹⁴ L.E. Goodman, *Avicenna*, (London: Routledge, 1992), 184.

al-Najāt and *Dānesh Nāma-yi-‘Alā’ī* does not correspond anymore with the nine books of Aristotle as followed strictly by the Baghdad School. The new order is basically much shorter and more precise. In terms of the content too, Ibn Sīnā states, for instance, in the introduction of his supposedly last work on logic, *al-Mantiq al-Mashriqiyyīn* (Logic of the Easterners), that the book is “to introduce our system of logic, which may appear to be in opposition to the existing Baghdad school.”¹⁵

Two main explanations in regard to the two schools have to be made here; Firstly, the differences between these two schools were not as hostile and exclusive as how they are viewed by Rescher in a few places in his book, using extreme terms like ‘the clash of the schools’ and ‘Avicenna’s attack on the Baghdād school’. For there are really no major differences between the two schools except that they represent two different approaches especially in regard to their reception and interpretation of Greek logic. Secondly, these schools of logic cannot be taken in isolation from a larger philosophical school which is known in the Islamic intellectual tradition as the peripatetic school the emergence of which, was caused by the attempt of the Muslims to transmit the Greek philosophical heritage to the Muslim world.

At any rate, these two schools, especially the school of Ibn Sīnā which had spread widely over Persia and other eastern parts of the Islamic world, were still flourishing at the time of al-Rāzī. At the same time, farther away in the western lands of Islam, the Baghdad school was on its rise in Spain with the coming of Ibn Rushd, another great Muslim commentator of Aristotelian logic. Ibn Rushd followed the tradition of the Baghdad school, particularly that of al-Fārābī, in commenting on the entire *Organon* of Aristotle as well as on his other philosophical treatises. Whether or

¹⁵ Ibn Sīnā, *Mantiq al-Mashriqiyyīn*, ed. Shukri Najjar (Beirut: Dār al-Hadāthah, 1982), 1. According to the views of some scholars the word *mashriqiyyīn* here only refers to the Greek, since this book is only one part of a bigger unpublished book of Ibn Sīnā entitled *al-Falsafah al-Mashriqiyyah* which elaborates the Greek philosophical ideas. See the introduction of the same reference by Najjār, 9.

not there was any influence of Ibn Rushd on al-Rāzī is itself another interesting area of investigation. But, as far as our research goes, we have no evidence to show any intellectual contact between the two other than a single report which claims that, in his travel to Transoxiana, al-Rāzī had gone further to Egypt and heard about Ibn Rushd's fame and thus decided to visit him. Unfortunately, he had to abandon his intention upon receiving the news of Ibn Rushd's death.¹⁶

B. Logic and the Religious Sciences

Another factor that forms the historical setting of logic at the time of al-Rāzī is the relation between logic and the religious sciences, especially theology. In the early period of Islamic theology, the term *mantiq* referred to an independent science and the theologians did not adopt it entirely, though they made use of some logical methods in their writings. They, on the other hand, talked about *Adab al-Kalām* or *Adab al-Jadal* which denoted not Greek logic but a more general body of knowledge.¹⁷ There were also heated debates over the nature and status of logic among the early Muslim scholars, one of which was the celebrated debate which took place in Baghdad between a famous translator and defender of logic, Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus (870-940A.C.) and a philologist, theologian and jurist, Abu Sa'īd al-Sirāfī (893-979A.C.).¹⁸ In the debate, the thesis put forward by Abū Bishr that [Greek] logic is "an instrument of speech by which correct speech is known from the incorrect" received vehement refutations by al-Sirāfī who, according to Muḥsin Maḥdī, was not only defending the grammarians

¹⁶ Zarkān, *Fakhr al-Din*, 21.

¹⁷ Josef van Ess, "The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology," in *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture*, ed. G.E. Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1970), 22.

¹⁸ For the comprehensive account of the debate, see Muḥsin Maḥdī, "Logic and Language in Classical Islam," in *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture*, ed. G.E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1970), 51-84.

but also indirectly the religion.¹⁹ This discussion can also be seen as a continuing struggle between the champions of Arabic and Islamic learning, mostly represented by the orthodox and the grammarians, and the followers of the Hellenistic tradition among the peripatetics. While the former insisted that logic, as imported from Greek, entailed the very contents of Greek philosophy, hence being irrelevant to the Islamic scientific tradition, the latter were of the opinion that logic was a value-free science and eligible to be an objective tool to other sciences.

This suspicious attitude towards logic and other foreign sciences was also noticeable in the later muslim scholars. Even Al-Rāzī's life was once endangered when he was accused of sacrificing Islam to the doctrines of Aristotle.²⁰ The traditional Islamic scholars at that time, though in a close observation, unconsciously used the underlying principle of logic, did not recognise logic as part of the religious sciences.

Nevertheless, although at the time of al-Rāzī, logic in large measure still continued to be criticized, generally it had already made its way into the Islamic tradition in some respects. It was, for example, accepted as part of the religious sciences in a few regions in the Islamic world around the early 12th century. The general structure of the basic Muslim pedagogical education had by that time placed logic in parallel with Qur'ānic studies, theology and religious law.²¹ This condition, though not widely accepted due to resistance in some places, had at least brought logic further to the front at least to the same level as the religious sciences.

¹⁹ Ibid., 61.

²⁰ A. S. Tritton, *Materials on Muslim Education in the Middle Ages* (London: n.p., 1957), 188.

²¹ Rescher, *Development*, 52.

The credit for defending logic against its opponents goes to the efforts of the previous theologians like al-Ghazālī²² and Ibn Ḥazm. Apart from defending logic in his autobiography *al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl*,²³ Al-Ghazālī, for instance, wrote several treatises, not only approving the neutrality of logic but even insisting on the theologians' need for logic. The theologians, according to al-Ghazālī, must be able to assess the weight of contending views, and this weighing of arguments is one of the subject matters of logic, aiming at distinguishing the demonstrative (*ṣaḥiḥ*) from the dialectical (*jadali*), the merely persuasive (*iqnāʿī*), the sophistic (*mughālaḥ*), and the poetic (*shīʿrī*). As for Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalūsī, a contemporary of al-Ghazālī, who was normally known as a strict traditionalist and who belonged to the orthodox camp, he strongly defended logic in his book, *Kitāb al-Taqrīb fī al-Ḥudūd wa al-Mantiq*.

Since the defence of logic by the above scholars was really strong, we can conclude that, at the time of al-Rāzī, the task of defending logic against the attacks of some orthodox scholars was not so difficult, if not unnecessary. Although we can still see some of his defensive arguments against the attack on logic, what seemed more important to al-Rāzī in his time was to further develop logical arguments suitable for theological ideas. Al-Rāzī has done this work mainly in two ways; firstly, by criticizing the established conception of Avicennan logic at that time, and secondly, by purposely giving ample place and assigning a major role for logic in the religious sciences.²⁴ The latter was probably more significant than the former, since it gave a firm philosophical approach to *Kalām* which was later adopted by many

²² For al-Ghazālī's writings on logic see al-Ghazālī, *Maqāsid al-Falāsifah*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā, (Egypt: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1960); *Mihakk al-Nazar fī al-Mantiq* (Beirut: Dar al-Nahḍa al-Hadīth, 1966); *Miʿyār al-ʿIlm*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā, (Egypt: Dar al-Maʿārif, 1960).

²³ Al-Ghazālī, *al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl*, ed. Abd. Halim Mahmud (Cairo: Matbaʿah al-Hassan, n.d.), 112-114.

²⁴ We can see these two approaches manifest themselves clearly in the classification of al-Rāzī's writings which we shall discuss later.

mutakallimūn after him.²⁵ His book *Muḥaṣṣal*, for example, in which he places the logico-epistemological discussion on *taṣawwurāt* and *taṣdīqāt* as the first topic of *Kalām*, has been viewed as a new standard of theological treatises.²⁶

3. His Logical and Philosophical Tendencies

Being a prolific scholar with an encyclopaedic mind, al-Rāzī's mastery of the philosophical and rational sciences is hardly superseded by others.²⁷ Ibn Khallikān reported that al-Rāzī was the greatest authority on the Greek sciences of his time and surpassed all his contemporaries in theology, metaphysics and philosophy.²⁸ As far as logic is concerned, he utilized it as an instrument in his intellectual endeavours. With this logical tool, together with his courage and convincing eloquent oratory, al-Rāzī held discussions with many opponents and prominent leaders such as the Karramites, and the Mu'tazilites, and converted many of them into the fold of *Ahl Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*.²⁹ His mastery of these sciences had its stamp on his other religious works such as *tafsīr*, *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *kalām*. His great *tafsīr*, *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb*, also known as *Tafsīr al-Kabīr*, has been viewed as the prototype of the exegesis based on individual opinion and reasoning (*tafsīr bi al-ra'y*), or in Ceylan's words, "the greatest work both in volume and importance."³⁰ It has been widely consulted by Muslim scholars as an encyclopaedic reference and it has many distinct features among which is the predominance of philosophy and logic throughout the

²⁵ Al-Rāzī's influence, especially his arrangement of theological treatises was very obvious in al-Ijī's *al-Mawāqif* and Taftazānī's *al-Maqāṣid*.

²⁶ Al-Rāzī, *Muḥaṣṣal Afkār al-Mutaqaddimīn wa al-Muta'akhhirīn min al-'Ulamā' wa al-Ḥukamā' wa al-Mutakallimīn* (Cairo: Maṭba'ah Ḥusainiyyah, 1905), 1. Hereinafter cited as *Muḥaṣṣal*.

²⁷ Apart from writing on logic and philosophy, al-Rāzī also writes voluminously on other rational sciences such as physics, medicine, mathematics, engineering, astronomy and law.

²⁸ Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A'yān*, transl. MacGuekin De Slane (London: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1843), 2:652. Hereinafter cited as *Wafayāt*.

²⁹ See the introduction of Ma'sūmī, *Akhlaq*, 1-29; Yasin Ceylan, *Theology and Tafsīr in the Major Works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī*, (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1996), 6.

³⁰ Yasin Ceylan, *Theology*, 15.

tafsir.³¹ In an index-analysis of this voluminous work, Michel Lagarde recorded 489 principles of jurisprudence, most of which stem from the principles of logic as used by al-Rāzī throughout his *tafsir*.³²

Al-Rāzī's writings on *uṣūl al-fiqh* are also redolent of the same attitude toward logic. In *al-Maḥṣūl fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, an authoritative reference on the principles of jurisprudence, Al-Rāzī treats logic, especially the chapter on terms (*alfāz*) and proofs (*adillah*), as an important preliminary tool to the science of *uṣūl al-fiqh*.³³ He discusses the division of terms (chapter two), derivative names (chapter three), the rule of synonyms (chapter four) and homonyms (chapter five). Although he places all these chapters under "Words on Language" (*al-Kalām fī al-Lughāt*), the contents are also largely related to the logical discussions. The discussion of those logico-linguistic chapters in *al-Maḥṣūl* runs parallel with and is similar to the discussion in his logical treatises proper such as *al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī al-Ḥikmah wa al-Mantiq*. This approach is very new and can hardly be found in the earlier works of *uṣūl al-fiqh* such as al-Shāfi'ī's *al-Risālah* and Malik's *al-Muwatta'*. It is clear that logic, apart from his independent treatment of it in his philosophical works, has been consistently emphasised by al-Rāzī in such religious sciences as *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

Perhaps, another genre of his writings which clearly bears the stamp of philosophical and logical vigour is his theological works thanks mainly to which al-Rāzī gained his fame in the history of the Islamic scholarship. In theology, a departure from the norms of previous theologians can be discerned in the writings of al-Rāzī particularly with regard to the treatment of logic. Al-Rāzī put more stress on

³¹ Husain Zahabi, *Al-Tafsir wa al-Mufasssirin* (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Hādithah, 1976), 1:293. Ibn Khallikān comments on this *tafsir* saying that al-Rāzī has collected in it all the strange things (*jama'a fihī kullu gharīb wa gharībah*) *Wafayāt*, 652.

³² Michel Lagarde, *Index du Grand Commentaire de Fahr al-Dīn al-Rāzī* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 16.

³³ Al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī 'Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, ed. Ṭaha Jābir al-'Alwānī (Beirut: Mu'assasah al-Rasālah, 1992), 1:219-285.

logic in the preliminary chapters of his theological works. For example, at the outset of his famous theological work, *Muḥaṣṣal*, he discusses at length the concepts (*taṣawwurât*) and judgements (*taṣdiqât*),³⁴--two of the most important topics in logic--the former dealing with theory of definition and the latter with that of syllogism. Similarly, in his *al-Mabâḥith al-Mashriqiyyah*, he gives a long explanation on definition and its conditions while discussing the indefinability of existence.³⁵

Since there is a close connection between logic and philosophy, such emphasis on logic can be seen as an outcome of al-Râzi's inclination to merge philosophy with theology, an approach that is generally associated with him. Ibn Khaldûn, who himself wrote *Lubâb al-Muḥaṣṣal* as a summary of al-Râzi's theological masterpiece, *Muḥaṣṣal*, affirms that al-Râzi was the first among the later scholars (*muta'akhkhirîn*) who successfully combined the problems of philosophy and Kalâm.³⁶ The reason why al-Râzi merged philosophy and theology according to Ibn Khaldûn is that these two sciences share the same objective in their content and problems as well as utilising the same function of reason in both of them. Before al-Râzi, the problems of theology were limited only to the role of Shari'ah which is more tradition-based with less reference to reason.³⁷ Echoing the same view, Fazlur Rahman states that with this new approach, al-Râzi offered a more systematic theology.³⁸

It is also equally important to point out that al-Râzi's emphasis on logical proofs in theology is not arbitrary, but due to his conviction of the superiority of the

³⁴ Al-Râzi, *Muḥaṣṣal*, 40.

³⁵ Al-Râzi, *Mabâḥith al-Mashriqiyyah fî al-'Ilm al-Ilâhiyyât wa al-Ṭab'iyyât* (Qûm: Maktabah Bidâr, 1989), 1:10-18.

³⁶ Ibn Khaldûn, *Muqaddimah* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-'Alam li al-Maṭbû'ah, n.d.), 466.

³⁷ Quoted from 'Uraybi, *al-Munjalagât*, 24-25.

³⁸ Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 96; Cf., Ibn Khallikân, *Wafayât*, 653.

rational proofs over the traditional ones.³⁹ This seemingly controversial principle can be traced in a few of his writings such as *Ma'ālim fi Uṣūl al-Dīn, al-Maḥṣūl* and *Muḥaṣṣal*. In these writings, Al-Rāzī considers rational proofs as vital and necessary in any argument to the extent that they must be the basis of the traditional proofs.⁴⁰ Proofs, states al-Rāzī, either consist of premises entirely traditional, or are entirely rational, or are composed of the two.⁴¹ The latter two are, according to al-Rāzī, possible while the first is impossible. This is because some traditional proofs may not establish the validity of other traditional proofs. To do so, one would need rational proofs. However, according to al-Rāzī, it is possible that some of the proofs are rational and some traditional. From these, al-Rāzī concludes that for every proof which is based on reports (*ikhbārī*), its occurrence is not possible unless it is substantiated by rational proofs.⁴²

The reason traditional proofs are not preferred by al-Rāzī is that they do not yield certainty (*al-naqliyyah lā tufidu al-yaqīn*). Explaining this further, he states:

Traditional proofs *do not yield certainty* [italics mine] since they are based on the transmission of language (*naql al-lughāt*), grammar (*al-naḥw*), and conjugation (*taṣrīf*) which are far from having the criteria of certain knowledge such as equivocality (*al-ishtirāk*), metaphor (*al-majāz*), conveyance (*al-naql*), concealment (*al-idmār*), priority (*taqḍīm*) and posteriority (*ta'khīr*), specification (*takhṣīs*), abrogation (*nāsikh*), and *mu'āriḍ al-'aḳālī* (rational opposites).⁴³

³⁹ The same ideas are mentioned in *al-Maḥṣūl* in the chapter on 'whether traditional proofs yield something certain or not', and *Nihāyat al-Uqūl wa Dirāyat al-Uṣūl*.

⁴⁰ Al-Rāzī, *Ma'ālim fi Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1984), 25; Al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl*, op.cit., 390-91.

⁴¹ Al-Rāzī, *Muḥaṣṣal*, 51.

⁴² Al-Rāzī considers perception (*al-nazar*) and contemplation (*al-fikr*) as the true arrangement (*tartīb*) of intelligible premises in order to reach certain knowledge. For instance, he refutes his opponents' view (the philosophers) -who denied the contingency of the world due to the existence of disagreement on it- by insisting that whatever conclusion reached through a true observation and contemplation, necessitates true knowledge. In other words, two premises which are true based on observation and contemplation must lead to a true conclusion. This logical rule must be the basis of all argumentation and proofs. *Ma'ālim*, 20-29.

⁴³ Al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl*, 391; *Ma'ālim*, 22. In *Muḥaṣṣal*, these criteria are called 'the ten rational criteria' through which a traditional proof can be rendered certain. *Muḥaṣṣal*, 51.

Al-Rāzī concludes that traditional proofs, since they lack these criteria, are considered conjectural (*maznūn*). Hence, whatever depends on something conjectural is itself conjectural (*al-mawqūf 'alā maznūn maznūn*).⁴⁴

From the above explanations, it is clear then that the role of logic in al-Rāzī's theological framework is not only substantial, but also a prerequisite.

4. His Place in and Contributions to Logic

Having explained the two factors that formed the historical setting of al-Rāzī's view on logic, it is now time to situate al-Rāzī's standpoint in that context. In fact, al-Rāzī's influence on later Muslim theologians and philosophers can be assessed from how involved he was in the controversy between the two opposing schools of logic.⁴⁵ It is interesting to realize that, in terms of his educational lineage as mapped out by Rescher, he belonged to the Baghdad school. Yet, the fact that he had produced extensive commentaries on Ibn Sīnā's logical works might prove just the opposite. But the historical sources clearly indicate that al-Rāzī studied logic under Ibn Malkā,⁴⁶ (ca.1075 - ca.1170 A.C.) who in logic was directly influenced by al-Farābī. Ibn Malkā, as Rescher claims, was a continuer of the Baghdad logical tradition, especially in regard to its characteristic relation to medicine and the philosophical sciences. He was also the opponent of Ibn Sīnā as attested to by his logical writings and ideas. Thus, it is natural that al-Rāzī, as a direct student of his, was very much influenced by his approach. Furthermore, the 13th century bore witness to the conflict between al-Rāzī's followers, such as al-Kāshī, Suhrawardī, al-Khūnajī, Ibn al-Nafīs,

⁴⁴ Al-Rāzī, *Ma'ālim*, 22.

⁴⁵ Rescher, *Development*, 58.

⁴⁶ His name is Hibat Allah 'Alī ibn Malkā Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī. He was a physician by profession and wrote on philosophical subjects, including logic. His famous logical work is *Al-Mu'tabar fī al-Hikmah*. According to Rescher, he was the leader in the counter-attack of the Baghdad school against Ibn Sīnā's criticism of them. Rescher, *Development*, 170.