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
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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC  
THOUGHT AND CIVILIZATION  
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AL-GHAZĀLĪ AND IBN TAYMIYYAH ON THE LEGITIMACY  
AND STATUS OF *'ILM AL-KALĀM*

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BY

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This work is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather, al-Haj Abdallah Malida.  
May Allah bestow upon him His mercy and make his grave one of the gardens of  
Paradise.

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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study has been to analyze , compare and contrast Hujjat al-Islām Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī's and Shaykh al-Islām Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyyah's contributions to the debate about the legitimacy and status of *'Ilm al-Kalām* in Islam. It was observed that as far as the problem of legitimacy and status of *kalām* is concerned, the views of these two scholars had a like direction, characterized by convergence on many points and divergence on others. This justifies our use of the comparative method of parallelism. This method was useful for us to ascertain whether any ideas, theories, or doctrines which seem to be similar in the thought of both scholars are actually similar or whether they are only superficially similar and used in different contexts to signify different intentions.

It has been found that al-Ghazālī's criticism of *kalām* was primarily based on his dissatisfaction with the dialectical method and with the way that method was unsatisfactorily used by many *mutakallimūn*. For him, dialectics was incapable of producing sufficiently strong arguments for defending Islamic doctrines against the contrary allegations of the detractors. Although he used it in his own works, he intended to limit its scope and to supplement it by other methods, particularly Logic, which he considered a neutral tool, capable of producing compelling arguments. By applying logic to *kalām*, he spearheaded a new orientation in *kalām*. Ibn Taymiyyah strongly opposed logic and attempted to refute it. For him, using logic in *kalām* would just erode, rather than enhance its status as an Islamic science. Both scholars agreed, however, that *kalām* doctrines must be derived from the Qur'ān and Sunnah,

but they disagreed about the allegorical interpretation of these sources. Besides his introduction of logic into *kalām*, al-Ghazālī's emphasis on the necessity of using the Ṣūfī approaches of direct experience and spiritual illumination can be considered his greatest contribution to the method of *kalām*. In this he was followed by Ibn Taymiyyah, whose contribution in this respect was understandably modest but nevertheless significant.

There is a strong agreement between both scholars on the necessity of purging Islamic doctrines of all alien philosophical doctrines which are opposed to the spirit of Islam. Basing himself on the Ash'arite explanation of the Islamic doctrines, al-Ghazālī taxed the philosophers with infidelity on three of their metaphysical doctrines and considered them innovators on all the others. Ibn Taymiyyah agreed with al-Ghazālī on that and gave him credit for his effort. But he joined other thinkers who unjustifiably accused al-Ghazālī of interpolating certain philosophical doctrines into *kalām*, although he himself defended some philosophical doctrines which are clearly opposed to the basic principles of Islam.

Al-Ghazālī's greatest contribution to the debate about the legitimacy and status of *kalām* in Islam was his integration of the discussion of *kalām* doctrines with the experiential approach of the Ṣūfis. This transformed *kalām* into a science aimed primarily towards guiding the believers in their preparation for meeting their Lord. There are indications in Ibn Taymiyyah's thought that he agreed with this experiential approach to *kalām*. All this leads us to conclude from the general direction of the thought of both thinkers that they considered *kalām* not only legitimate, but also the most important science in the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme. However, because of Ibn Taymiyyah's literalist approach, they had fundamental differences on the most important subject matter of *kalām*.

## INTRODUCTION

The legitimacy of the science of *kalām*, which is concerned with rationally adducing proofs to support Islamic beliefs and to refute allegations of detractors, has been a subject of discussion among Muslim thinkers throughout the ages. In the earliest days of the debate, the ultra-rationalist Mu'tazilah considered *kalām* not only legitimate in Islam, but also obligatory upon all mature Muslims. This position was countered by the conservative traditionalists, led by Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), who considered this science an undesirable innovation in Islam. The general attitude, however, was that although this science was not obligatory or even necessary, it was very important for defending Islam against attacks by heretics and opponents. This was the position propagated by many of the Ash'arites as well as the Māturīdites.

With the decline of Mu'tazilism, Ash'arism and Ḥanbalism became the major schools of thought in the Muslim world, and the legitimacy of *kalām* emerged as one of the major points of difference between these two schools. This is most clearly illustrated in the thought of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) – the most influential thinkers on contemporary Muslim thought. Al-Ghazālī's greatness as a scholar was immediately recognized during his lifetime, whereby he was given the title *Hujjat al-Islām*. For Ibn Taymiyyah, recognition came more than three centuries after his death,

particularly at the hands of the Wahhābīs in Saudi Arabia and later by the Salafiyyah based in Egypt.<sup>1</sup>

The purpose of this study is to compare the contributions of al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyyah to the long debate about the legitimacy and status of *‘ilm al-kalām* in Islam. Although it is recognized that Ibn Taymiyyah was no match for al-Ghazālī as far as his scholarly contributions about *kalām* are concerned, there are some grounds on which a comparison of their contributions to the debate about the legitimacy and status of *kalām*. Of particular importance is the influence of both scholars on contemporary Muslim thought. Ibn Taymiyyah has been elevated, especially by the Wahhābīs and the Salafiyyah to a level where he appears as great as, if not greater than, al-Ghazālī. Moreover, these modernist Muslims often take the views of Ibn Taymiyyah as the basis in their attacks on *kalām* and the *mutakallimūn*, particularly al-Ghazālī. Furthermore, it is noted that al-Ghazālī, in spite of being one of the greatest *mutakallimūn*, criticized the approach of many *mutakallimūn* to *kalām*. Ibn Taymiyyah apparently benefited from al-Ghazālī’s criticism of *kalām* on which he added other points of his own. Nevertheless, he continued practicing what can be validly referred to as *kalām* – although he and his followers would not like the term.

The above grounds indicate that it is worthwhile to compare the views of al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyyah about the legitimacy and status of *kalām*. This comparison will help us to see how both scholars attempted to solve three major problems related to *kalām*, namely: (a) What is the legitimate approach to *kalām* subject matter? (b) How should the *mutakallim* deal with ‘foreign elements’ that can

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<sup>1</sup> Fazlur Rahman, *Revival and Reform in Islam: A Study of Islamic Fundamentalism*, (Oxford: One World, 2000). See pages 115-16 for al-Ghazālī and 132 where he states that “while al-Ghazālī’s influence was almost immediate, Ibn Taymiyyah’s message lay dormant through the centuries. And even when it was ‘discovered’ by Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and his followers in the eighteenth-century Arabian peninsula, it was miserably truncated.”

be confused with *kalām* subject matter? (c) What is the ultimate purpose of *kalām*, and what changes must be introduced in it in order for it to adequately fulfill that purpose?

In trying to answer the above questions, it will become clear how much Ibn Taymiyyah benefited from al-Ghazālī's views about the legitimacy and status of *kalām*. It will also become clear that Ibn Taymiyyah, following al-Ghazālī, did not totally reject *kalām* – as contemporary modernist Muslims may want us to believe. It will also help us to understand to what extent and why the two scholars agreed and differed in their explanations of important *kalām* topics, particularly that dealing with the Essence and Attributes of God. All this will ultimately help us to do justice to both scholars by placing each one of them in his rightful place.

Before a comparison of al-Ghazālī's and Ibn Taymiyyah's contributions to the debate about the legitimacy and status of the science of *kalām* can be made, it is necessary to briefly outline the nature and development of this science as well as the early debate about its legitimacy in Islam. It is only in the context of that historical background that we can understand the significance of al-Ghazālī's and Ibn Taymiyyah's contributions to this debate. We shall therefore begin by a brief outline of the nature and development of *kalām*, followed by a section on the early questioning of the legitimacy of *kalām* and the efforts to defend its legitimacy by its proponents. Finally, we shall very briefly explain the method of inquiry and the procedure followed in this study.

## A. Nature and Development of *Kalām*

Before embarking on a discussion of the development of *kalām* and the debate about its legitimacy, it is pertinent that we try to understand what 'the science of *kalām*' actually stands for. The definition of the science of *kalām*, variously known as *'Ilm Uṣūl al-Dīn*, *al-Fiqh al-Akbar*, *'Ilm al-tawhīd*, and *'Ilm al-'aqā'id al-Islāmiyyah*, has attracted the attention of various scholars.<sup>2</sup> Some of the definitions emphasize its subject matter and purpose whereas others emphasize the methods of inquiry used in it. In the present study, we shall basically refer to al-Taḥānawī's definition and explanation of the nature of this science which, I suppose, is a good synthesis of all the previous definitions.

Al-Taḥānawī defined *kalām* as "the science which enables one to affirm the doctrines of religion [and to prove them] to others by adducing proofs and eliminating doubts (*daʿ al-shubah*)."<sup>3</sup> Therefore, the subject matter of *kalām* includes whatever is helpful in establishing, affirming and defending religious doctrines, like the affirmation of the eternity (*al-qidam*) and unity (*al-wahdāniyyah*) of God. It also includes the premises on which such doctrines are established. Such premises include the composition of bodies from substances, the possibility of the vacuum, the theory of the states (*al-ahwāl*), the substance (*al-jawhar*), and accidents (*al-rāq*). Atoms and other matters discussed by the *mutakallim* for the same purpose.

Al-Taḥānawī also distinguished between *kalām* and metaphysics (*al-'ilm al-ilāhī*) as discussed by philosophers. *Kalām* is based on the Islamic principles (*qanūn*

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<sup>2</sup> For the various definitions of *kalām*, see al-Shahrastāni, *al-Milal wa al-Nihal*, (Cairo: Maktabat al-Salām, 1929), 10; Ibn Khaldun, *al-Muqaddimah*, (Cairo: al-Maṭba'at al-Bahiyyah, n.d), 327 {trans. Franz Rosenthal, 3 vols (New York: Pantheon, 1958), 3:34 }; and Muḥammad Ibn 'Alī al-Taḥānawī, *Kashshāf Istilāḥāt al-Fuṣūn*, (Istanbul: Kahraman Yayinlari, 1984), 22- 33.

<sup>3</sup> al-Taḥānawī, *Kashshāf Istilāḥāt al-Fuṣūn*, 22.



*al-Islām*) whereas metaphysics is based on pure reason, regardless of whether it agrees with religion or not. In this discussion, he introduced the criterion for distinguishing legitimate *kalām* from illegitimate *kalām* which does not follow the principles of Islam. Nevertheless, one who uses such false *kalām* is still considered a *mutakallim*.<sup>4</sup>

It is important to note that Tahānawī considers *kalām* to be based on certain proofs (*dalā'il yaqīniyyah*) which are derived from reason and corroborated by tradition (*al-naql*). This, according to him, leads to certainty.<sup>5</sup> It is because of that certainty that the science of *kalām* is considered to be at a higher level than all other religious sciences.

Thus *kalām* is considered to involve the establishment and affirmation of the basic doctrines of religion (*uṣūl al-dīn*) and to defend them against the contrary arguments of the opponents. It is therefore the foundation (*asā*) on which the other religious sciences such as *fiqh* (jurisprudence), and *tafsīr* (exegesis of the Qur'ān) are based. If we cannot prove the existence of a Creator Who is omniscient ('*alīm*), omnipotent (*Qadīr*), and Who charges human beings with responsibility (*mukallif*), sent messengers and revealed Books, we cannot imagine the existence of such sciences as exegesis (*tafsīr*), jurisprudence (*fiqh*) or the principles of jurisprudence (*uṣūl al-fiqh*). Since all the other religious sciences are based on the principles which are laid down by the science of *kalām*, it is, therefore, the chief of all religious sciences.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

As for the derivation of the term '*kalām*' a number of views have been put forward. The most original views on this topic can be considered to be those of al-Taftāzānī.<sup>7</sup> He explained the possible derivation of the term *kalām* to be from: (1) the usage of the term *kalām* in introducing subjects of discourse; (2) its being concerned with discussing the problem of the divine speech (*kalām* Allah); (3) the fact that, like *maṭīq*, it imparts the ability to speak, and (4) that it is learned by speech only; (5) its use of the dialectical method which is based on speech; (6) its disputatious and argumentative nature, which necessitates the use of speech to refute the opponents' views; (7) the cogency of its arguments which makes it as if it is the only discourse; and (8) its strong proofs and penetration of the hearts which may be referred to as *al-kalām*, a word derived from *al-kalm* (wound).<sup>8</sup>

From the above, it is reasonable to suggest that the subject matter, method and name of this science is basically Islamic. Wensinck remarks that "*kalām* has nothing to do with the Greek *logos* or any of its derivations but was prepared by the development of Arabic terminology itself."<sup>9</sup> Watt also agrees that *kalām* is basically and fundamentally an Islamic discipline. He however maintains that any attempt to define *kalām* has to emphasize its method rather than the subject-matter of '*aqīdah*'. He therefore argues that the term *kalām* was originally applied to refer to the use of

<sup>7</sup> Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharh al-'Aqā'id al-Nasafiyyah*, ed. Ahmad Hijāzī al-Saqā, (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliyāt al-Azhariyyah, 1987), 10-11, [*A Commentary on the Creed of Islam*, trans. Edgar Elder, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), 7-8].

<sup>8</sup> See also Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 50. Wolfson commented that Ibn Khaldun's remark that the term *kalām* could have been derived from the fact that it deals with faith which is, by definition, a matter of speech (*kalām*), is a novel understanding of the meaning of *kalām* which conforms to the real nature of this science. H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1976), 4-8. By agreeing with Ibn Khaldun on this, Wolfson apparently contradicts his earlier view that the term *kalām* was derived from the translation of the Greek term *logos*. See *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, 1-2.

<sup>9</sup> Wensinck, A. J. *The Muslim Creed*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed, (Cambridge: University Press, 1979, repr., Oriental Books Reprint, New Delhi, n.d.), 79 (page reference is to the reprint edition.)

'reasoned arguments' in defense of religions doctrines. This later on developed and it acquired the meaning of 'argument from premises derived from reason' (and not from revelation).<sup>10</sup> This application of 'reasoned arguments' in the defense of religious doctrines can be traced from the earliest days of Islam.<sup>11</sup>

In total disregard of all that , many modern scholars try to find extra-Islamic origins for the science of *kalām* by tracing its doctrines and methods to Persian, Indian and pre-Islamic Arabic pagan religions, as well as the Christian, Judaic and Greek philosophical thought.<sup>12</sup> However, given its subject matter and methodology, we cannot but affirm that *kalām* is and has always been a genuinely Islamic Science. By this, we are not denying the fact that in the dialectical process of rationally refuting the arguments of infidels (*kuffār*) and innovators(*mubtadi'ah*), which were contrary to the Islamic creed, the *mutakallimūn* adopted some of the methodologies and terminology of their opponents. This, however, did not fundamentally affect the Islamic identity of this science, as we shall try to clarify in our discussion of the development of *kalām*.

We shall very briefly trace the development of *kalām* from its origin through various stages of its development right up to the time it became incorporated into the Islamic scientific tradition as an independent discipline. This will further clarify the issues of identity and naming discussed in the previous section. We need to

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<sup>10</sup> W. M. Watt, *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam*, (London: Luzac & Co., 1948), 93-94.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 94

<sup>12</sup> For example, R. M. Frank, " The Neoplatonism of Gahm Ibn Safwān." *Le Museon* (Louvain) 78 (1965): 395-424; *idem*, " Kalām and Philosophy: A Perspective from one Problem." In *Islamic Philosophical Theology*, ed. Parviz Morewedge. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1979); H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, 17-18; Ignaz Goldziher., *Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law*, tr. Andras and R. Hamori, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 81-85. This author links his discussion of the development of *kalām* with his views about the development of hadith. By this he implies that the doctrines of the *mutakallimūn* and the hadiths used to prove them were fabricated for political reasons, especially during the Umayyad caliphate. See *Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law*, 67-79, *passim*.

know, for example, whether the usage of the term '*kalām*' was a source of pride for the *mutakallimūn* or whether it was a derogatory term applied to them by their adversaries. For the sake of brevity and clarity, we shall omit all direct considerations of the views of different sects and schools on specific doctrines as well as their specific arguments concerning those doctrines. Instead, we shall just concern ourselves with the outline of the systems and methods of this science as it gradually unfolded, with the express aim of situating the debate about its legitimacy and status.

For the sake of outlining the process of development of *kalām*, I will basically use Acikgenc's views about the development of sciences within the Islamic world view. By using that scheme, we can see clearly how *kalām* gradually unfolded in the various stages of its development. Acikgenc posited that for any science to develop there needs to be three "mental frameworks": a "conceptual environment" which represents the worldview of the scientist, a "scientific conceptual scheme", and a "network of technical vocabulary."<sup>13</sup> As far as the science of *kalām* is concerned, it is very difficult to deny the fact that it originated from and developed within the Islamic Worldview as its "conceptual environment". It is within this worldview and specifically within the scientific conceptual scheme of Islam expressed in the first

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<sup>13</sup> Alparslan Acikgenc, *Islamic Science: Towards a Definition*, (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1996), 66. The development of *kalām* has been discussed in a very concise and insightful manner by Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *A Commentary on the Hujjat al-Siddiq of Nūr al-Dīn al-Rānīrī*, (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Culture Malaysia, 1986), 208-213. See also Watt, *Freewill and Predestination*, Goldziher, *Islamic Theology and Law*, 67-115; and, especially for the early developments, Josef Van Ess, *Anfänge Muslimischer Theologie*, (Beirut: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1977); idem, "Early Development of Kalām" in G. H. A. Juynboll, ed., *Studies on the First century of Islamic Society*, (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), 109-123; and M. Abdul Haleem, "Early Kalām," in S. H. Nasr and Oliver Leaman, eds. *History of Islamic Philosophy*, 2 vols, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 71-88.

place in the holy Qur'ān and secondly by the Prophet as the major interpreter of the Qur'ān, that the science of *kalām* originated.<sup>14</sup>

Following the three mental frameworks mentioned above, Acikgenc puts it that for any body of knowledge to be established as a science, it has to pass through three stages:

1. The stage of problems, where scattered and discrete studies of various problems are carried out for a period of time;
2. The stage of a scientific tradition, which arises as a result of conventional consensus among the scholars; general subject matter and method may be determined at this stage;
3. The stage of giving a specific name to a certain body of knowledge.<sup>15</sup>

For the sake of convenience, the above stages will be referred to as the problem stage, the disciplinary stage and the naming stage respectively.

### I. The Problem Stage

The problem stage of the development of *kalām* involved first and foremost, the establishment and gradual elucidation of the Islamic Worldview. This was followed, and possibly overlapped, by the establishment of the knowledge structure, and finally culminated into the formation of the "Islamic Scientific Conceptual Scheme" of which *kalām*-related problems were an integral part. The Islamic

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<sup>14</sup>For a lucid explanation of the nature of the worldview of Islam see S. M. N. al-Attas, *Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: an Exposition of the Fundamental Elements of the Worldview of Islam*. (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1995). See especially pages 1-39.

<sup>15</sup> Acikgenc, *Islamic Science*, 68.

worldview established at this stage in the teachings of the Holy Qur'ān as well as in the Sunnah of the Prophet included, among the major elements, belief in the unity of God (*al-tawhīd*), belief in revelation (including the messengers, books and angels). There was also talk about the issue of predestination (*qadar*) as well as eschatology. Of paramount importance in the Islamic worldview thus established were the teachings about man, his responsibility and his actions.

Within that worldview, a knowledge structure developed based primarily on the Qur'ān, with the Prophet as the sole interpreter. At this stage, the concept of knowledge (*'Ilm*) was outlined. Knowledge was qualified and a distinction made between useful and harmful knowledge. Seeking of knowledge was sanctified, and many verses were revealed exhorting believers to acquire knowledge and praising those who possess it. We can also see from this stage many verses encouraging believers to utilize reason and to use 'reasoned arguments' or discursive arguments for understanding the context of the revelation as well as in their dialogues with the infidels concerning religious doctrines.<sup>16</sup>

We can possibly trace the emergence of problems which later on became characteristic problems of *kalām*, to the Qur'ān itself. Such issues like the nature of God and His attributes, the 'anthropomorphic verses', the question of the divine decree or predestination (*qadar*), and the problem of human responsibility which results from it, are all mentioned in many verses of the Qur'ān, especially in the early stages of revelation.<sup>17</sup> However, the mere existence of such verses did not pose much of a problem to the early Muslims. With the Prophet (PBUH) among them, they always had a ready source of reference in case something happened to be difficult to

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 73-81, and al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa al-Nihal*, 21-22.

<sup>17</sup> Watt, *Free Will*, chapter 2, passim; Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed*, 3-11.

understand. This does not mean, however, that discussion on doctrinal matters was totally non-existent. On the contrary, there existed, especially during the Madinite period, a learning circle organized within the prophet's mosque.<sup>18</sup> These people seriously engaged in learning activities which were not only limited to the memorization and transmission of the Qur'ān and Sunnah but also included the interpretation and understanding of the revelation, of which *kalām*-related problems were a major component.

After Prophet Muhammad's death, with the exception of the slight problems related to his succession, there seems to have been a smooth continuation of the transmission of the revelation. The '*ulamā'*', as heirs to the Prophets, acquired a special significance not only as transmitters but also as interpreters of revelation. This, coupled with the spread of Islam far and wide, led to the establishment of various centers of learning headed by prominent companions of the Prophet. The political turmoil towards the end of 'Uthmān's (d. 35/665) caliphate, which led to his death and the ensuing scuffles between the companions, and later 'Alī's confrontation with Mu'āwiyah (d. 60/680) at Siffin, which ended in the notorious *Tahkīm* (arbitration), can be rightly considered a turning point in the development of *kalām*. The aftermath of all this was the appearance of the Khārijite and Shī'ite political movements. In such an atmosphere, certain *kalām* doctrines, which could be said to have been adequately explained and settled by the Prophet, acquired special political significance.<sup>19</sup> Thus among the problems which were raised at that time were such issues as the problem of *imāmah* (leadership), and directly resulting from this, the status of believer (*mu'min*) which the *imām* must possess. This in turn

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<sup>18</sup> Acikgenc, *Islamic Science*, 81-85.

<sup>19</sup> Al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa al-Nihal*, 27; Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed*, 37-53, *passim*.

raises the issues regarding the nature of *imān* (faith), the conditions of salvation and the question of man's responsibility.<sup>20</sup> These issues were later followed by a discussion of the divine attributes in general and the divine attribute of speech (*al-kalām*) in particular and how all that is related to the unity of Allah (*al-tawhīd*).

The Umayyad capture of power and their appeal to the doctrine of *qadar* (predestination), as a means of legitimizing their regime, further precipitated the development of *kalām*-related discussions. In this context, discussion about the doctrine of *qadar* acquired a special significance, especially given the despotism of the Umayyads.<sup>21</sup> Of the most important players at this point, were the Khawārij who initially held that nothing can happen except what God wills, but they further remarked that God's will and God's command are one. And logically, since we do not know the former but we know the latter, emphasis was put on upholding God's command. Watt eloquently summarizes their position that: "the conception of the righteous God demanding righteousness from His creatures leads by an irresistible logic to the doctrine of human responsibility with its corollary the doctrines of Qadar, namely that man has power to perform the duties imposed on him."<sup>22</sup>

All this contributed to the fanatical intransigence of the Khawārij, especially their very extreme positions regarding sinners and the exclusion of such sinners from the community of the believers. Thus, it can be said that despite their apparent acceptance of the doctrine of *qadar*, they still managed to interpret it and put it in

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<sup>20</sup>Fazlur Rahman considered the question of *Imān* to be the first problem that led to the development of *kalām*. See his *Islam*, 2d ed., (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 86.

<sup>21</sup>Watt argues that the problem of freewill and predestination was the major issue behind the development of *kalam*. See his *Freewill and Predestination in Islam*, Chapter 1, *passim*. Goldziher apparently agrees with Watt on this, but gives it an entirely political motivation. See *Islamic Theology and Law*, 77-83. See also James Pavlin, "Sunni *Kalām* and Theological Controversies", in S. H. Nasr and Oliver Leaman, eds., *History of Islamic Philosophy*, 1: 71-88.

<sup>22</sup>Watt, *Freewill and Predestination*, 38.