

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT
AND CIVILIZATION (ISTAC)

THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE IN AL-GHAZALI
A PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF EPISTEMOLOGY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC
THOUGHT AND CIVILIZATION (ISTAC)
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE M. A. DEGREE

BY
MOHD ZAIDI BIN ISMAIL

KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA
AUGUST, 1995



الجامعة الإسلامية العالمية ماليزيا
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA
بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

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Preface

Abū Hāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, widely known as the Proof of Islām (*Hujjat al-Islām*), has always occupied a special position in the whole tradition of Islamic thought. Various studies have attempted to discover, or uncover, the content of such a position. One which still needs more unveiling, and constitutes, accordingly, the general aim of my research, is the epistemological spectrum of his thought and contribution. Nevertheless, epistemology itself is so vast an area to be covered in a single M. A. thesis. My focus, therefore, is a systematic formulation of that epistemological part of al-Ghazālī's thought which deals with the sources of knowledge, conducted chiefly within a psychological framework. In this approach, the issues of man and his different levels of perceptive faculties are treated mainly from the point of view of the subject of knowledge. This treatment is then connected with the ontologico-cosmological status of the objects of knowledge. In this relation, other such central problems as certainty, ontological permanence, psychological clarity of apprehension and vision, universality and others are brought into the scene and tackled appropriately. Such a framework, as will be demonstrated in this study, is very holistic in its coverage of various epistemological channels, which are indispensable in an epistemological process. The interdependence of these integrative parts of gnosiology will represent al-Ghazālī's epistemological system, looked primarily from the angle of man as the subject of knowledge.

Now, almost nine centuries have elapsed since the death of al-Ghazālī. Within such a long period of time, many events have taken place. Recently, the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) has established the academic Chair of Islamic Thought in the name of al-Ghazālī, the first holder of which is Prof. Dr. Syed Muhammad

Naquib al-Attas. It is also at this institute, with its serene physical surrounding and conducive intellectual atmosphere, that I get the opportunity of benefitting directly from Prof. al-Attas, pursued my post-graduate study, and consequently, carried out this particular research on al-Ghazāli.

Many people with all their whole-hearted kindness have contributed, directly or indirectly, to the study until it appears finally in its present shape. Thus, even to express partly my full appreciation to all of them requires me to compose another work, may be as thick as the size of the present work, so as to commemorate all their meaningful insights, cordial assistance and compassionate encouragement. Nevertheless, I owe some individuals special thanks and acknowledgment. To begin with, throughout the period of writing the thesis, Professor Dr. Alparslan Açıkgenç, who is my supervisor, has granted me freedom of enquiry. His series of lectures, some of which I attended as a full-credit student--especially his "system" approach, have inspired me a lot.

Associate Professor Dr. Wan Mohd Nor b. Wan Daud was very helpful in many respects, and does not fail to show his continuous concern with my development. The understanding Mr. Mat Ali b. Mat Daud, now the Registrar of ISTAC, has made many "administrative" aspects related to my academic work and official jobs easier and enjoyable for me. To Prof. Dr. Ernest Wolf-Gazo and Mr. Muhammad Zainiy Uthman, thanks for your kind suggestions and patient proof-readings of the drafts of my thesis.

My parents have been supporting me until I reached the present stage. For them, I dedicate this special work, as one of the many fruits of their constant care and fond support.

Above all, only God is worthy of praise. From Him every thing proceeds and to Him all will return.

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List of Abbreviations

A1	<i>Fayṣal al-Tafrīqah</i> , English trans. McCarthy, "Appendix I" in <i>Freedom and Fulfillment</i>
A2	<i>Faḍā'ih al-Bāṭiniyah</i> , English trans. McCarthy, "Appendix II" in <i>Freedom and Fulfillment</i>
A3	<i>Qisṣās al-Mustaḳim</i> , English trans. McCarthy, "Appendix III" in <i>Freedom and Fulfillment</i>
A4	<i>Al-Maqṣad al-Asnā</i> , Partial English trans. McCarthy, "Appendix IV," in <i>Freedom and Fulfillment</i>
A5	<i>Sharḥ Kitāb 'Ajā'ib al-Qalb</i> , Partial English trans. McCarthy, "Appendix V," in <i>Freedom and Fulfillment</i>
ARB	<i>Al-Arba'in fī Uṣūl al-Dīn</i>
CKI	<i>Classification of Knowledge in Islam</i>
DDC	"The Doctrine of Divine Command: A Study in the Development of Ghazālī's View of Reality," <i>Islamic Studies</i> , XXI, no. 3 (1982)
Death	<i>Kitāb Dhikr al-Mawt wa mā ba'dahu</i> , English trans. T. J. Winter, <i>The Remembrance of Death and the Afterlife</i>
FAF	<i>Qawā'id al-'Aqā'id</i> , Eng. trans. N. A. Faris, <i>The Foundations of the Articles of Faith</i> .
FT	<i>Fayṣal al-Tafrīqah bayna'l-Islām wa'l-Zandaqah</i>
Ihyā'	<i>Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn</i>
II	<i>al-Iqtisād fī'l-'Iṭiqād</i>
Iljām	<i>Iljām al-'Awāmm 'an 'Ilm al-Kalām</i>
JW	<i>Jawāhir al-Qur'ān</i>
KH	<i>Sharḥ Kitāb 'Ajā'ib al-Qalb</i> , Malay trans. <i>Keajaiban Hati</i>
KI	<i>Kitāb al-'Ilm of Ihyā'</i> , Eng. trans. <i>The Book of Knowledge</i>
Kimiya	<i>Kimiya-i Sa'adat</i>
MA	<i>Mishkāṭ al-Anwār</i> , English trans. W.H.T. Gairdner, <i>The Niche of Lights</i> .

<i>Ma'ārij</i>	<i>Ma'ārij al-Quds fī Madārij Ma'rifat al-Nafs</i>
<i>Maqṣad</i>	<i>al-Maqṣad al-Asnā fī Sharḥ Ma'āni Asmā' Allāh al-Ḥusnā</i>
<i>Masā'il</i>	<i>Masā'il fī Ma'rifat Allāh</i>
<i>MDN</i>	<i>al-Maḍnūn bihi 'alā ghayr Ahlihi</i>
<i>MDNSGH</i>	<i>al-Maḍnūn al-Ṣaghīr</i>
<i>MF</i>	<i>Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah</i>
<i>MIFM</i>	<i>Mi'yār al-'Ilm fī Fann al-Manṭiq</i>
<i>Mishkāt</i>	<i>Mishkāt al-Anwār</i>
<i>Mizan</i>	<i>Mizān al-'Amal</i>
<i>MMD</i>	<i>al-Munqidh minā'l-Ḍalāl</i> , English trans. McCarthy, <i>Freedom and Fulfillment</i>
<i>MMG</i>	<i>Manusia Menurut al-Ghazali</i>
<i>MQMMN</i>	<i>Ma'ārij al-Quds</i> , Eng. trans. Al-Ghazālī's <i>the Ascent to the Divine Through the Path of Self-Knowledge</i>
<i>MS</i>	<i>Mi'rāj al-Sālikīn</i>
<i>MSTF</i>	<i>al-Mustasfā min 'Ilm al-Uṣūl</i>
<i>Munqidh</i>	<i>Qaḍiyat al-Taṣawwuf: al-Munqidh minā'l-Ḍalāl.</i>
<i>NM</i>	<i>The Nature of Man and the Psychology of the Human Soul</i>
<i>NN</i>	<i>al-Maqṣad al-Asnā</i> , Eng. trans. <i>The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God</i>
<i>Qistās</i>	<i>al-Qistās al-Mustaqīm</i>
<i>RIQ</i>	<i>The Recitation and Interpretation of the Qur'an: al-Ghazali's Theory</i>
<i>RL</i>	<i>al-Risālah al-Laduniyah</i> , English trans. Margaret Smith, <i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, Part II (1938)</i>
<i>RSLD</i>	<i>al-Risālah al-Laduniyah</i>
<i>Tahāfut</i>	<i>Tahāfut al-Falāsifah</i>

Introduction

Al-Ghazālī (450/1058-505/1111) is one of those few scholars who never cease to inspire and guide the Muslim community. This might be one of the reasons why studies on this particular intellectual figure have been pursued until the present time, and will most probably continue in the future. Among the types of surveys on al-Ghazālī, both past and present, which can be so far considered relatively adequate are biographical researches. Mainly relying on his *al-Munqidh mina'l-Dalāl*, these studies concentrate on the stages of his intellectual life as well as on the most probable chronology of his writings.¹ Considering the adequacy of existing literatures on his life, I, therefore, opt not to cover such an area in the present study.

This study, accordingly, selects al-Ghazālī's epistemology as its object. Its primary aim is to disclose this scholar's understanding of the sources, or channels, whereby knowledge comes into the possession of any particular human being. Notwithstanding al-Ghazālī's fame among the Muslim community, there are very few serious studies carried out on this spectrum of al-Ghazālī's thought, especially as far as the English literature is concerned. Even of these few studies, most of them, though dealing with such a discussion, do not treat this subject as their main purpose. Nevertheless, I do not claim comprehensiveness and exhaustiveness of the present study. It should rather be viewed as one step in setting forth a final holistic restatement of al-Ghazālī's epistemology. In this respect, our study could not have been easily carried out without the proper ground works undertaken by past researches.

¹Some of these earlier studies have been already listed in our *Selected Bibliography*.

Since our concern is to restate the sources of knowledge in al-Ghazālī's epistemology, the main feature of our study will, therefore, be descriptive. Al-Ghazālī, as is generally known among scholars of Islamic studies, is a prolific scholar who, within his relatively short life-span, produced various works, extending from short treatises to voluminous books. It is natural therefore that his explanations are scattered, here and there, throughout his various intellectual products. In order to realize our aim, our descriptive study needs to be through and through analytical as well as synthetic. In this regard, the method adopted will be mainly inter-textual commentary, in the sense that only al-Ghazālī's own expositions are consulted in explaining points found in his writings.

In so doing, I assume an active interpretative role, but only within the boundary set by al-Ghazālī's writings. This role will be primarily of a reconciliatory and accomodative one--of course, insofar as it is deemed possible--whenever there exist at least apparent contradictions, inconsistencies, or incoherencies between al-Ghazālī's own accounts.² I opt, therefore, for an expansion of the horizon of al-Ghazālī's epistemological system, rather than confining it within a limited area structured by al-Ghazālī's expositions in his few books, the popular ones especially.³

It is well recognized that the most crucial problem of epistemology is the nature and ways of acquiring knowledge. Since the psychology of the person and other related problems are also relevant to epistemological problems, as a philosophical science, epistemology is closely linked to such philosophical disciplines as logic, ontology, cosmology, psychology and more recently, philosophy of mind.⁴ As this is the case, we

²The one, which comes immediately to my mind in this regard, is the famously acclaimed difference between al-Ghazālī's explanation in his books on *'ilm al-mukāshafah*, dedicated for a selected few, and that found in his writings dealing with *'ilm al-mu'āmalah*, meant for a more public reading.

³This is a method preferred by some scholars, for example, W. M. Watt in his "The Authenticity of the Works Attributed to al-Ghazālī," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1949), 5-22; "A Forgery in al-Ghazālī's *Mishkāt*," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1949); and *Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al-Ghazālī* (Edinburgh, 1963).

⁴For a detailed discussion, see Dagobert D. Runes, ed. *Dictionary of Philosophy* (Totowa: Littlefield, 1971), s.v. "Epistemology", p. 94; cf. A. R. Lacey, *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2d ed. (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), s.v. "Epistemology", p. 63; *Encyclopædia Britannica: Knowledge in Depth*, 15th ed. (Chicago, 1985), s.v. "Epistemology," by Richard I. Aaron, pp. 601-602; and also

shall also make an attempt in the present study to approach our subject from all its related aspects. In fact, only this holistic approach can do justice to al-Ghazālī's epistemology. Nevertheless, on account of the paramount role of man as the epistemological subject, we will pursue this study within a certain matrix, namely, al-Ghazālī's psychological framework.

In addition, a source of knowledge or a means of attaining knowledge, be it past or present, is considered also as a means of the manifestation of a truth in us. In this manner, a source also serves as "a criterion of truth" (that which distinguishes truth from error) and as "a motive of certitude" (that which moves the intellect to grasp and assent without fear of error).⁵ As such, to attend to knowledge in most cases involves, as well, the problem of certitude. Therefore, as preliminaries to our survey on the sources of knowledge, we should have a brief look at al-Ghazālī's understanding of what knowledge is, its relation to truth and certainty, and the psychology of the subject—better known in al-Ghazālī's own term as the substratum of knowledge. Considerations of all these will bring us to a proper perspective of the sources of knowledge in relation to other integrated components of epistemology in al-Ghazālī's psychological framework.

Knowledge in Relation to Truth and Certainty

That al-Ghazālī highly esteems knowledge is something very obvious in his various writings, and is a matter beyond any reasonable doubt. Although knowledge is of various types and is subject to a certain hierarchical scheme, al-Ghazālī regards knowledge, in general, beyond all other matters.⁶ Al-Ghazālī maintains that knowledge is of an

Antony Flew, ed. *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, revised 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), s.v. "Epistemology", p. 109, and s.v. "knowledge", p. 194.

⁵See Walter F. Cunningham S. J., *Notes on Epistemology* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1958), pp. 81-82.

⁶See especially, *Kitāb al-'Ilm of Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* with Zayn al-Dīn 'Irāqī's *al-Mughnī 'an Hamī al-Asfār fi'l-Asfār fi Takhrij mā fi'l-Ihyā' mina'l-Akhbār* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah, 1986), pp. 23-24; hereinafter cited as *Ihyā'*, 1. English trans. Nabih Amin Faris, *The Book of Knowledge* (reprint, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1991), pp. 26-29; henceforth abbreviated as *KI*. See also *Al-Mustafā min 'Ilm al-Uṣūl* (Cairo: Mu'assasah al-Ḥalabī wa Shirkāh li'l-Nashr wa'l-Tawzī', n. d.), hereafter cited as *MSTF*, 1, p. 3; *Al-Arba'in fi Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Beirut: Dār al-Jil, 1988), hereafter cited as *ARB*, p. 6, and

intermediary category being sought for two objectives; as a means to an end and as the end itself.⁷ In his words, "it is in itself delightful (*ladhidhan fi nafsihi*) and therefore sought for its own [intrinsic value] (*maṭlūban li dhātihi*)", as well as, "... a way which leads to the Hereafter and its happiness, the only means whereby we come close to God (*wasilatan ilā dār al-ākhirah wa sa'ādatihā wa dhari'ah ila'l-qurb min Allāh ta'ālā wa lā yatawaṣṣal ilayhi illā bihi*)".⁸

Knowledge, in his view, includes worldly and religious matters as well as intellectual realities [or intelligibles] (*al-umūr al-dunyawīyah wa'l-ukhrawīyah wa'l-ḥaqā'iq al-'aqliyah*). All these transcend sensory perceptions (*al-maḥsūsāt*) and are not shared by the animals. In fact, the necessary universal knowledge (*al-'ulūm al-kullīyah al-darūriyah*), known also as primary intelligibles (*al-ma'qūlāt al-ūlā*), is the sole characteristic of the intellect (*khawāṣṣ al-'aql*). It is given, that is, present in the intellect (*ḥādir*). That which is already attained will not be sought. As such, it is an inherent contradiction to seek such primary and necessary knowledge as "a single person cannot be in two different places simultaneously." This is an intellectual judgment on every individual event (*'alā kull shakhṣ*) on account of the obvious fact that it is not apprehended by the senses which perceive only some individuals. Such a judgment on all individuals is something additional to the one perceived by the senses. If this is so, in regard to that knowledge whose necessity is manifest (*al-'ilm al-zāhir al-darūri*), it is even more obvious with respect to the rest of the speculative-discursive knowledge (*sā'ir al-nazarīyāt*). Nevertheless, this latter type of knowledge does not find the intellect always in agreement with it every time it recurs to the intellect. The intellect in fact has to be shaken

194-195; *Kimiya-i Sa'adat*, ed. Husayn Khadiw-djam (Tehran: Center for Scientific and Cultural Publications, 1983), hereafter cited as *Kimiya*, pp. 25-27; *Mizān al-'Amal*, ed. Sulayman Salim al-Bawwab (Damascus: Dar al-Hikmah, 1986), henceforth abbreviated as *Mizan*, pp. 44-45, 88-89, and 101-108; and *al-Risālah al-Laduniyah*, edited with an introduction by Riyad Mustafa al-Abd Allah (Damascus: Dar al-Hikmah, 1987), hereinafter abbreviated as *RSLD*, p. 24. Cf. F. Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970), p. 95; and Mohamed M. Benomran, "Al-Ghazzali's Epistemology and Cognitive Educational Objectives" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1983), Chapters Two and Three.

⁷*Iḥyā'*, 1, p. 23 (*KI*, p. 25).

⁸*Ibid.* (*KI*, p. 26).

up and stimulated by a kind of incitement in comprehending such knowledge. This stimulation is brought about by the words of wisdom (*kalām al-ḥikmah*). Upon the shining of the light of wisdom (*ishrāq nūr al-ḥikmah*), the intellect becomes actual after it was so only potentially. The greatest wisdom, indeed, is the words of God especially the Qur'ān.⁹

Knowledge is "seeing things as they really are."¹⁰ The thing is occasionally denoted as the known (or object of knowledge) (*ma'lūm*), or as an existent (*mawjūd*). "The thing as it really is" is the reality (*ḥaqīqah*) of the thing, its quiddity (*māhiyah*), its essence (*dhāt*), its universal meaning (*ma'nā al-kullī*), or its spirit (*rūḥ*).¹¹ In this sense, knowledge is tantamount to perceiving the reality of a thing. It is the corresponding representation (*mithāl muṣābiq*) of the object, is synonymous with the intelligible (*al-ma'qūlah*), and occupies a certain mode of existence which is identified, by al-Ghazālī, as "mental existence" (*al-wujūd fi'l-adhḥān*), or formal cognitional existence (*al-wujūd al-'ilmī al-ṣūri*). Therefore, in an epistemological process, it is the *spirit* of a thing, but not the thing itself, that is apprehended. Moreover, for knowledge in the sense of certitude of truth to materialize, the correspondence between the cognitive form (*al-ṣūrah al-'ilmīyah*),

⁹*Ihyā'*, 3, p. 9; al-Ghazālī, *Qaḍīyat al-Taṣawwuf: al-Munqidh mina'l-Dalāl*, edited together with other articles by 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1988), hereinafter cited as *Munqidh*, p. 334; al-Ghazālī's *Ma'ārij al-Quds fi Madārij Ma'rifat al-Nafs* (reprint, Beirut: Dār al-Āfaq al-Jadīdah, 1978), henceforth abbreviated as *Ma'ārij*, pp. 51-52. English translation with introduction, analysis and summary by Yusuf Easa Shammās, "Al-Ghazālī's the Ascent to the Divine Through the Path of Self-Knowledge" (Ph.D. diss., Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1958, obtained through Michigan: U-M-I, 1987), hereafter abbreviated as *MQMMN*; al-Ghazālī's *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, ed. Abu 'Ala 'Afīfi (Cairo: al-Dar al-Qawmiyyah, 1964), will be after this abbreviated as *Mishkāt*, p. 49. English trans. W.H.T. Gairdner, *The Niche of Lights*. (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1952), hereafter cited as *MA*, pp. 92-93; and *MIFM*, pp. 173-180.

¹⁰*KI*, p. 73.

¹¹Al-Ghazālī, *Fayṣal al-Tafrīqah bayna'l-Islām wa'l-Zandaqah*, ed. Riyād Muṣṭafā (Damascus: Dār al-Hikmah, 1986), hereafter abbreviated as *FT*, pp. 52-53. English trans. R.J. McCarthy, "Appendix I," chap. in *Freedom and Fulfillment: An Annotated Translation of al-Ghazālī's al-Munqidh mina'l-Dalāl and other Relevant Works of al-Ghazālī* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1980), hereafter cited as *A1*, p. 152; al-Ghazālī, *al-Maqṣad al-Asnā fi Sharḥ Ma'āni Asmā' Allāh al-Ḥusnā* (Limassol: al-Jaffan and al-Jabi, 1987), will be after this cited as *Maqṣad*, p. 25; Partial English trans. McCarthy, "Appendix IV," chap. in *Freedom and Fulfillment, op. cit.*, hereafter designated as *A4*, p. 336. Full English annotated trans. David B. Burrell and Nazih Daher, *The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God* (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1992), henceforth abbreviated as *NN*, pp. 6-7, 19, and 37; *RSLD*, p. 22. English trans. Margaret Smith, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, Part II (1938), hereafter cited as *RL*, p. 191; and *Ihyā'*, 3, p. 14.

which is the consequent, and the existential form (*al-šūrah al-wujūdiyyah*)—or the form's existing in individuals (*al-šūwar fi'l-a'yān*)—which is the antecedent, must hold.¹²

We have seen above how perception should be understood in the sense of a representation, being inscribed or reflected in the soul. In order to simplify this complexity, al-Ghazālī cites an analogy of a mirror, an object and the reflection of the object in the mirror—three different, but inter-related states. On such an example then, he proceeds to base his conviction that the soul is the actual seat of knowledge. For knowledge is the representation of the real object in the heart, and knowing is when such an image is reflected in the mirror of the heart. Nevertheless, there is another vital element, without which, even the presence of those three items is of no avail for the materialization of a complete perception. This element is the light, usually identified with the Active Intellect, the Preserved Tablet, or the Angel Gabriel. Indeed, this "parable of the mirror" plays a vital role throughout his psychologico-epistemologico-ethical discussion.¹³

In al-Ghazālī's view, there exist hierarchies of knowledge, and besides the knowledge of God, the one that also ought to be achieved is knowledge of the permanent realities.¹⁴ These realities of things which are inclusive of all that have passed in the

¹²*Maqṣad*, p. 78 (NN, p. 71). See also *MSTF*, pp. 24-26; *RSLD*, pp. 21-22 (RL, 191); *Ma'ārij*; al-Ghazālī's *Mi'yār al-'ilm fi Fann al-Manṭiq* (Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1964), henceforth identified as *MIFM*, pp. 50-51, 74-75, 81, 138-139, 232, and 250; and *ARB*, p. 43. For the difference between Divine Knowledge and human knowledge viewed from this angle, see *Maqṣad*, pp. 78-79, 87 (NN, pp. 71, 80-81, and 129); *Ma'ārij*, pp. 166-167; Abdul Haq Ansari, "The Doctrine of Divine Command: A Study in the Development of Ghazālī's View of Reality," *Islamic Studies* XXI, no. 3 (1982), hereinafter cited as *DDC*, pp. 11 and 15-16; al-Ghazālī, *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān* (Beirut: Manshūrāt Dār al-Afaq al-Jadidah, 1983), hereafter abbreviated as *JW*, p. 26. Malay version of the English translation by Muhammad Abul Quasem, *The Jewels of the Qur'ān: al-Ghazālī's Theory* (Bangl, 1978), p. 37; *Al-Maḍnūn bihi 'alā ghayr Ahlihi*, ed. Riyāḍ Muṣṭafā (Damascus: Manshūrāt Dār al-Hikmah, 1986), hereinafter cited as *MDN*, p. 46. For the English translation of some portions of *MDN* and al-Ghazālī's *al-Maḍnūn al-Ṣaḡhir*, ed. Riyāḍ Muṣṭafā (Damascus: Manshūrāt Dār al-Hikmah, n. d.), hereinafter cited as *MDNSGH*, see 'Abdul Qayyum Shafaq Hazārvi, *The Mysteries of the Human Soul* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1981). This notion resembles the one held by ibn Sinā from whom, most probably, al-Ghazālī has benefitted a lot. See, for example, a discussion of such a conception of ibn Sinā and the subsequent critiques and modifications by Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā in Bilal Kuspınar, "Mullā Ṣadrā's Criticism of ibn Sinā and al-Suhrawardī on the problem of God's Knowledge," *Islami Arastirmalar (Journal of Islamic Research)* 5, 1 (Jan. 1991).

¹³For some of the instances, see *Mizan*, pp. 35-41; and *Chapter One*, note 14.

¹⁴*NN*, p. 60. In regard to the ontological status of the object of knowledge, he does mention that knowledge occupies the status of existence (*wa'l-'ilm ḥukmuhu ḥukm al-wujūd*). As such, "the domain of the intellect (*majāl al-'aql*) is the entirety of existents (*al-mawjūdāt kulluhā*)." *RSLD*, p. 25 (RL, p. 192); and *Mishkāt*, p. 45 (*MA*, p. 87).

world, together with all that are to come, have been already inscribed by God on the Preserved Tablet. It is from this Tablet that every sort of events and things is manifested in the external world. Previously, we have stated that to have a real knowledge of something is, for al-Ghazālī, to know its essential reality, or quiddity. Since realities of things are already there in the Tablet, having real knowledge, in this context, boils down to receiving those realities. It is from the Preserved Tablet that the realities of things are reflected on the human soul, which is, by its natural disposition, ready to receive the realities of the *knowns* (or the objects of knowledge) (*ḥaqā'iq al-ma'lūmāt*), either in the latter's direct approach towards the Tablet, which is generally called specific intuition, or in its indirect manner, identified as abstraction.¹⁵ It is also within this context of direct and indirect approaches to the realities, or to put it differently, intuition, understood as a species and as a genus, that we will survey the sources of knowledge in al-Ghazālī's epistemology.

Indeed, the main objective of al-Ghazālī's search, and so are the rest of the sufis, is the knowledge of the realities of things (*al-'ilm bi ḥaqā'iq al-umūr*), especially as perceived in the soul's primordial disposition (*fiṭrah*). The reality of knowledge (*ḥaqīqat al-'ilm*) is none other than certain knowledge (*al-'ilm al-yaqīnī*). For him, certitude consists in the utmost degree of clarity of the thing known, so much so, that no kind of the negation of that degree is possible, actually or potentially.¹⁶

Thus, in its utmost clarity, certainty and knowledge are two faces of the same thing. Knowledge, in this sense, already entails truth for "the thing as it really is", is just another way of saying "the thing as it truly is." The intelligible, in al-Ghazālī's view, is that through which the intellect comes in contact with the existent (*al-mawjūd*). Truth occurs when the intelligible corresponds to the existent. Therefore, when the thing is considered in

¹⁵*Jhyā'*, 3, pp. 22-24 (*KH*, p. 48); al-Ghazālī's *Ijām al-'Awāmm 'an 'Ilm al-Kalām*, ed. Riyāḍ Muṣṭafā al-'Abd Allāh (Damascus: Dār al-Hikmah, 1986), henceforth cited as *Ijām*, pp. 66-67; *NN*, pp. 86, 104, and 120-121; *MDNSGH*, pp. 67-70; *Mishkāt*, pp. 70-71 (*MA*, pp. 133-136); and al-Ghazālī's *Kitāb Dhikr al-Mawt wa mā ba'dahu*, English trans. T. J. Winter, *The Remembrance of Death and the Afterlife* (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1989), hereafter abbreviated as *Death*, p. 151; and *ARB*, p. 12.

¹⁶*al-Munqidh mina'l-Dalāl*, English trans. McCarthy, *Freedom and Fulfillment*, *op. cit.*, hereafter identified as *MMD*, p. 63; *Mizan*, p. 105; and *MIFM*, pp. 142-146.

itself (*min haythu dhātihi*), it is named existent. However, considered in relation to the intellect, which perceives it as it is, it is qualified as "true". "The thing as it really is" also connotes the sense of permanence (or self-subsistence) for the involvement of change or relativity will result in the thing becoming something which is not as it really is before. In other words, the duration of a thing, being as it really is, occupies a central role in knowledge. Permanence in a way already subsumes another basic factor, namely "universality". The more universal a thing is, the more permanent is its "unitary" relation with all the particular units.¹⁷ Hence, at least, two elements play a fundamental role in shaping knowledge: the factor of "permanence" which refers more to the object of knowledge, and the principle of "clarity" which concerns itself more with the perceiving subject. In brief, certainty relates more to the psychological degree of clarity, while truth-reality is connected more with the ontological extent of permanence.

In al-Ghazālī's framework, certainty is a double-sided concept; having negative and positive aspects. The former is conceived as the methodical understanding of certainty by virtue of knowing its negations; certainty, in this sense, culminates in the logical demonstrative certainty. For this scholar, in the case of certainty wherein the soul assents (*al-taṣḍīq*) willingly to a proposition and becomes tranquil with it, three conditions are fulfilled. First, the soul becomes definitely convinced of the truth of such a proposition, and introspectively, definite as well of the validity of his conclusiveness, which by no means is due to negligence, absent-mindedness, error and confusion. Second, the soul affirms conclusively the proposition and by no means feels the possibility of its opposite. Even if the soul were to entertain such a possibility, it will be very hard for the soul to accept such a case. Third, the soul becomes at rest with a thing as well as confirms it, whether or not, the soul feels its opposite.¹⁸

¹⁷*Maqṣad*, pp. 126-127 (*NN*, pp. 124-125); and *MIFM*, pp. 92-94, 138-140, 173-180, 184, 191-193, and 253-255.

¹⁸*Ihyā'*, 1, p. 88 (*KI*, p. 193); and *MSTF*, pp. 43-44. Cf. Osman Bakar, "The Place of Doubt in Islamic Epistemology: al-Ghazzālī's Philosophical Experience," chap. in *Tawhid and Science* (Penang: Secretariat for Islamic Philosophy and Science, and Nurin Enterprise, 1991), pp. 39-60; and Eric L. Ormsby, "The Taste of Truth: The Structure of Experience in al-Ghazālī's *al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl*," in

The positive aspect, on the other hand, is to be comprehended as the explanation of those elements that constitute certainty. This latter aspect of certainty, which is really the aim of the sufis and most of the religious scholars, is explained by al-Ghazālī to consist in four developmental levels; the first being the logical certainty (the highest negative but the lowest level of positive certainty), which is the soul's affirmative inclination to the object, second, followed by the prevalence of the affirmation over the soul, thirdly, its taking hold of the heart, and lastly, its ruling over the soul-heart, leading either to action or avoidance.¹⁹ This level appears to be nothing but the full realization of the harmonious relation between the theoretical and the practical aspects of the intellect, or the unity of knowledge and will, leading to an overall justice in one's personality.

To make it brief, the negative aspect of certainty can be viewed as representing the objective demarcating part of it, while the positive aspect can be considered as its subjective-intensive part. These two aspects of certainty, taken together, constitute al-Ghazālī's holistic understanding of it. The degree of certainty as being vague (*al-khafā'*) or clear (*al-jalā'*) is attributable to both aspects, whereas the qualification of certainty as being either weak (*al-dīf*) or strong (*al-quwwah*), or little (*al-qillah*) or great (*al-kathrah*) is solely confined to the latter aspect. Therefore, whatever comes below logical certainty is regarded as vague, whereas whatever that is above is considered clear. Nevertheless, the degree of clarity differs, it might be strong and great, or weak and small. This degree is determined, among other things, by the mystical experiential certitude, one possesses. What is implied from al-Ghazālī's explanation is his regarding disbelief as pure darkness.²⁰

Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J. Adams, ed. Wael B. Hallaq and D. P. Little (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991).

¹⁹*Ihyā'*, 1, p. 89 (*KI*, p. 195).

²⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 89-90. However, the consideration that disbelief or unbelief is pure darkness is clearly asserted by al-Ghazālī in his *Mishkāt* especially in its second section on the veils (*al-hijāb*). On how such an understanding suits exactly with his explanation regarding man's knowledge, during his worldly life, of God and of other realities in relation to man's vision of God and the unveiling of other realities in the Hereafter, see *ARB*, pp. 196-197, and 205-207; *Ma'ārij*, pp. 157-163; and *Ihyā'*, 4, pp. 269, and 329-332.

Few matters are thus clear from such an understanding. First, one can perceive a thing either as it really is, or not as it really is. Grasping the reality of a thing, i. e. perceiving a thing as it really is, already involves degrees of clarity. Clarity is indeed one of the ruling ideas in al-Ghazālī's conception of certainty. Second, the reality of a thing necessarily involves the element of permanence or self-subsistence. The more this element is inherent in an object, the more real it becomes; hence, the truer the perception is. Third, the substratum of knowledge then is human being. But what is human and which aspect of a person is directly involved in an epistemological process? If we assume that there is an aspect of human being that acts as the substratum, through what process and channels can the universal meaning or reality of a thing--in short, knowledge--be imprinted on that aspect of man. In other words, how does knowledge in the sense of certitude of the truth, however minimum it may be, take place? What is the channel of its realization? To answer this urging question requires us to attend first to another preliminary remark, that is, the psychology of a person. This is indeed central for we intend to conduct our study within al-Ghazālī's own psychological framework.

Human Soul as the Substratum of Knowledge

Human soul, regarded by al-Ghazālī as the subject of knowledge, receives the forms of objects (*ṣuwar al-ma'lūmāt*) and comprehends the realities of existents (*ḥaqā'iq al-mawjūdāt*), without being concerned with their corporeality (*a'yān*) and individuality (*ashkhāṣ*).²¹ Like the physical body, the soul possesses as well an organ of sight. As outward sensible things are perceived with the ordinary eye, inward realities are apprehended with the eye of the intellect.²² Therefore, al-Ghazālī's psychology constitutes one of the basic foundations for his epistemology.

²¹RSLD, p. 44 (RL, p. 198). For *a'yān* as *shakhṣī* or *juz'ī*, see MIFM, pp. 67-68, and 196.

²²RSLD, p. 44 (RL, p. 198).; MMD, p. 98; MA, first part; KI, p. 141; Death, pp. 126, and 149-150; and ARB, pp. 196-197, 200, 212, and 218.

Within this psychological framework, man derives his nobility from his predisposition to have the knowledge of God (*ma'rifat Allāh*), which is attained through his heart (*qalb*)—the other components of man merely being its instruments, and the other cognitions being subordinated under and related to such knowledge.²³ There are four inter-related terms: *al-nafs* (the soul), *al-rūḥ* (the spirit), *al-qalb* (the heart), and *al-'aql* (the intellect). Each of them has at least two meanings, one physical, and the other, spiritual. Insofar as knowledge is concerned, only the spiritual aspect is of direct relevance.²⁴

Heart, in the spiritual sense, is a divine spiritual subtlety (*laṭīfah rabbānīyah rūḥānīyah*) which constitutes man's essence (*ḥaqīqat al-insān*) and is the one that perceives, knows and is cognizant (*al-mudrik al-'ālim al-'ārif*).²⁵ In this regard, it is the human spirit that carries God's Trust, is embellished with gnosis, in which by natural disposition knowledge is firmly embedded, and is the witness of the Divine Unity with the saying "Yea!" (*al-rūḥ al-insānī al-muḥtamil li amānat Allāh al-mutaḥalli bi'l-ma'rifah al-markūz fihi al-'ilm bi'l-ḥiṭrah al-nāṭiq bi'l-tawḥīd bi qawlihi balā*).²⁶ It is the origin of human being (*aṣl al-ādami*) and the end of all creatures (*nihāyat al-kā'ināt*) in the Hereafter (*fī 'ālam al-ma'ād*).²⁷

Conceived in such a manner, the spirit as the perceiving, knowing subtlety (*al-laṭīfah al-'ālimah al-mudrikah*) is that very heart itself.²⁸ It points to the creature which stems from God's Command (*al-mubda' al-ṣādir min amr Allāh Ta'ālā*) and which is the substratum of cognitions, revelation and intuition (*maḥall al-'ulūm wa'l-waḥy wa'l-ilhām*). It is of the angelic kind (*min jins al-malā'ikah*), is immaterial (*mufāriq li'l-'ālam*

²³*Ihyā'*, 3, p. 3.

²⁴See also al-Ghazālī's *Mi'rāj al-Sālikin*, in *Al-Quṣūr al-'Awālī min Rasā'il al-Imām al-Ghazālī*, compiled by Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Abū al-'Alā (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jundi, 1972), hereafter cited as *MS*, pp. 100-104; *RSLD*, pp. 29-51; *MIFM*, pp. 211-217; al-Ghazālī's *Kitāb al-Imlā' fī Ishkālāt al-Iḥyā'*, in *Ihyā'*, *op. cit.*, 5, hereafter cited as *Imlā'*, p. 37; and *Kimiya*, pp. 15-22.

²⁵*Ihyā'*, 3, p. 4.

²⁶*Ma'ārij*, p. 17.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 17.

²⁸*Ihyā'*, 3, p. 5.

al-jismānī) and subsists by itself (*qā'im bi dhātihi*).²⁹ The term "spirit", in its spiritual usage, also applies to the spirit which is an equivalent for all the angels (*al-rūḥ alladhī fi muqābalah jamī' al-malā'ikah*) and is the first creature (*al-mubda' al-awwal*). This is the Holy Spirit (*rūḥ al-quds*).³⁰ This term is likewise used to denote the Qur'ān. In brief, it is an expression for that by which any living thing persists (*mā bihi ḥayāh mā*).³¹

The soul, considered as a physical entity, is a meaning comprehending both the human faculties of anger and lust (*al-ma'nā al-jāmi' li quwwat al-ghaḍab wa'l-shahwah fi'l-insān*), that is, the animal faculties (*al-quwā al-ḥayawānīyah*) as opposed to the intellectual faculties (*al-quwā al-'aqliyah*). This meaning is preponderantly intended by the mystics as the comprehensive source of all blameworthy human qualities (*al-aṣl al-jāmi' li'l-ṣifāt al-madhmūmah mina'l-insān*).³² As for its spiritual aspect, the soul is that subtlety, denoted as well by the terms "heart" and "spirit", which is in reality the man (*hiya al-insān bi'l-ḥaqīqah*). In other words, it is the very man himself—meaning its essence and reality, that knows God and the rest of the knowns (*nafs al-insān ayy dhātuhu wa ḥaqīqatuhu al-'ālimah bi Allāh Ta'ālā wa sā'ir al-ma'lūmāt*).³³ It is the substance (*al-jawhar*) that comes from the Angelic World (*'ālam al-malakūt*) and the Realm of Command (*'ālam al-amr*),³⁴ and acts as the substratum of the intelligibles (*maḥall al-ma'qūlāt*). Nevertheless, the soul is qualified differently according to the difference of its accidental states (*aḥwālihā al-'arīḍah 'alayhā*); thus, we have *al-nafs al-muṭma'innah*, *al-nafs al-lawwāmah*, and *al-nafs al-ammārah bi'l-sū'*, the latest being the soul considered in its physical meaning.³⁵

²⁹*Ma'ārij*, p. 17. Cf. *Iḥyā'*, 4, pp. 120-121.

³⁰*Ma'ārij*, p. 17. For a general explanation on kinds of angel, see *Iḥyā'*, 4, pp. 125-129.

³¹*Ma'ārij*, p. 18.

³²*Iḥyā'*, 3, p. 5; *Ma'ārij*, p. 15.

³³*Iḥyā'*, 3, p. 5.

³⁴For more on the World of Command (*'ālam al-amr*) and the World of Creation (*'ālam al-khalq*), see *ARB*, p. 43; *Kimiya*, p. 17; *MDN*, pp. 77-79; and *MDNSGH*, pp. 38-39, 54-56, and 67.

³⁵*Iḥyā'*, 3, p. 5; and *Ma'ārij*, pp. 15-16.

The term "intellect" sometimes denotes the First Intellect (*al-'aql al-awwal*) which is occasionally referred to as the Active Intellect (*al-'aql al-fa'āl*), the Angel Gabriel, the Holy Spirit (*rūh al-quds*), the Universal Soul (*al-nafs al-kullī*), one of the hearts of the closest angels (*qulūb al-malā'ikah al-muqarrabūn*), the Pen (*al-qalam*), the Preserved Tablet (*al-lawḥ al-mahfūz*), the Clear Book (*al-kitāb al-mubīn*), or the Clear Example (*imām mubīn*).³⁶ This term also means the perceiver of knowledge (*al-mudrik li'l-'ulūm*). In this last manner, it is the very subtlety itself, synonymous with the terms "heart", "spirit" and "human soul (*al-nafs al-insāniyah*)". Sometimes, by this term, is intended the knowledge of the realities of things (*al-'ilm bi ḥaqā'iq al-umūr*). Viewed in this regard, it is an expression for the quality of knowledge whose locus is the heart (*'ibāratan 'an šifat al-'ilm alladhī maḥalluhu al-qalb*). As the soul's attribute (*šifat al-nafs*), its relation to the soul is as the relation of the sight (*al-baṣar*) to the eye (*al-'ayn*). By means of this quality, the soul is in a position to perceive intelligibles as the eye, by the medium of sight, is ready to apprehend the sensibles. In short, the term *al-'aql* sometimes points to the attribute of the one who knows (*šifat al-'ālim*), and sometimes, the substratum of perception (*maḥall al-idrāk*)--namely, the perceiver himself (*al-mudrik*).³⁷ There are other meanings attributed to the term "intellect" which will be discussed further in *Chapter Two*.

It is clear, therefore, that insofar as human beings are concerned, all of those four terms apply to four meanings. These meanings of the terms are entities--actually existing: the physical heart, the physical spirit, the lustful soul, and the cognitions (*al-'ulūm*). However, there is a fifth meaning, viz., the perceiving knowing subtlety of man. All of those four terms coincide in this single meaning. Hence, the meanings are five but the

³⁶FT, pp. 52-53, and 58-60 (*AI*, pp. 152, and 154-155); *RSLD*, pp. 39-40, 95, and 99-100; *Iḥyā'*, 3, p. 21-23. Malay-Indonesian trans. Nurhickmah, *Keajaiban Hati* (Singapore: Pustaka Nasional, 1991), hereafter cited as *KH*, pp. 48-49; *Iḥyā'*, 4, p. 537 (*Death*, pp. 151-152); *Imlā'*, p. 45; *Mizan*, pp. 41, 77, 102, 108, and 149; *MDN*, p. 73; *MIFM*, pp. 214-217; and *Ma'ārij*, pp. 17-18, 67, 112-115, 123-127, 142-143; 173, and 176. Cf. al-Jurjāni, *Kitāb al-Ta'rīfāt*, ed. G. Flugel (reprint, Beirut: Librairie Du Liban, 1990), s.v. "*al-lawḥ*", p. 204; Muḥammad 'Alī bin 'Alī al-Tahānawī, *Kitāb Kashshāf Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Funūn* (reprint, Istanbul: Kahraman Yayınları, 1984), 2, s.v. "*al-lawḥ al-mahfūz*"; and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Intellect and Intuition: Their Relationship from the Islamic Perspective," in *Islam and Contemporary Society*, ed. S. Azzam. (n.p.: Islamic Council of Europe, 1982).

³⁷*Iḥyā'*, 3, p. 5; and *Ma'ārij*, p. 18.

terms only four. Each term applies to two meanings, one is physical and the other, spiritual.³⁸ Conceived in such a manner, by soul, spirit, heart and intellect, al-Ghazālī means human soul that is the essence of human being as well as the substratum of the intelligibles.³⁹

As a whole, human soul has three distinct powers, the vegetative, the animal-sensitive, and the rational.⁴⁰ As our concern is epistemology, only two aspects of the soul are directly relevant, to wit, the sensitive-animal soul (*al-nafs al-ḥayawānīyah*) and the rational soul (*al-nafs al-nāṭiqah*). In the former, there are mainly two faculties; the perceptive (*al-mudrikah*) and the motive (*al-muḥarrīkah*) powers. In fact, life consists in perception and action (*anna al-ḥayy huwa al-darrāk al-fa'āl*). As for those beings who are living--that is, possessing both perception and action, it is the kinds involved and accordingly, the degree of perfection in each that determine their nobility.⁴¹ Even though both faculties are related to each other--since they issue forth from the same principle, only the first sensitive faculty is relevant to the epistemological discussion, whereas the second is treated particularly in psychology and ethics, as it relates more to action and practices.⁴² Therefore, throughout this study, our focus will be mainly directed to the perceptive faculties of the sensitive-animal soul as well as the rational soul. These faculties can be generally stated as the senses, be they external or internal, and the intellect, be it discursive or intuitive. The former represents the sensitive-animal soul, while the latter, the rational

³⁸*Iḥyā'*, 3, p. 6.

³⁹*Ma'ārij*, p. 18.

⁴⁰For a detailed exposition of these human faculties, see al-Ghazālī's *Ma'ārij (MQMMN)*; al-Ghazālī's *Maqāsid al-Falāsifah*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1961), hereafter cited as *MF*, pp. 346-385; al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-ma'ārif, 1957), henceforth abbreviated as *Tahāfut*, pp. 252-256; *MS*, pp. 114-116, and 145-146; *Mizan*, pp. 25-33; *MSTF*, pp. 33-35; and *MIFM*, pp. 173-180, and 211-214. For a concise summary of al-Ghazālī's *Ma'ārij* together with some comparisons with Avicenna's works on psychology and epistemology, refer to Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *The Nature of Man and the Psychology of the Human Soul* (KL: ISTAC, 1990); henceforth cited as *NM*; and also Muhd. Yasir Nasution, *Manusia Menurut al-Ghazālī* (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 1988), hereafter cited as *MMG*, Chapters III and IV; al-Ghazālī, *Kitāb Riyāḍat al-Nafs and Kitāb Kasr al-Shahwatayn*, English trans. T. J. Winter, *Al-Ghazālī on Disciplining the Soul & on Breaking the Two Desires* (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1995), Appendix III, pp. 233-243.

⁴¹*NN*, pp. 33-34, and p. 129. Cf. *MF*, p. 347.

⁴²*Ibid.*, pp. 347-348.

soul. Nevertheless, even though imagination as an internal sense belongs to the sensitive-animal soul proper, it has dual aspects; one pertaining to that soul, and the other attending to the rational soul. This peculiarity, therefore, requires a special treatment from us.

Yet, the main procedure of the present study will be an emphasis on the psychological framework of al-Ghazālī's epistemology with regard to the sources of knowledge. We shall thus begin with discussing "Senses: the Representative Source of Knowledge", in *Chapter One*. Our discussion will be continued, in *Chapter Two* with "Intellect: the Discursive Source of Knowledge". *Chapter Three* shall be allocated for a discussion of "Heart: the Intuitive Source and the Seat of Knowledge." *Chapter Four*, then, will treat "Imagination: the Symbolic Source of Knowledge." Our last chapter will be the *Conclusion* which consists of a summary account of the sources of knowledge in al-Ghazālī's epistemology, based upon all the foregoing discussion.

Chapter One

SENSES: THE REPRESENTATIVE SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE

The perceptive faculty (*al-mudrikah*) of the sensitive-animal soul, according to al-Ghazālī, has two inter-dependent perceptive powers; the external senses (*al-ḥawāss*)—or known also in his *Sharḥ Kitāb 'Ajā'ib al-Qalb* as the exterior soldiers of the heart, and the internal senses (*quwā mudrikah min bāṭin*) which are included in the interior soldiers of the heart.¹ The former refers specifically to those five ordinary human senses, viz., the senses of sight, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching. The interior soldiers, on the other hand, consist of three capacities. First, will (*al-irādah*) which is the instigating and inciting capacity, either to attain the useful and suitable, known as the appetite (or desire), or to repel the harmful and the incompatible, called irascibility (or anger); second, power (*al-quḍrah*), which is the capacity to move the members to acquire or to avoid something determined by the previous capacity. Both, the first and the second capacities, are characteristic of the motive faculties of the sensitive-animal soul. Third, perception which gets to know and uncovers things, and it is signified as knowledge and perception (*al-'ilm wa'l-idrāk*).²

In man's original condition, his substance is created pure and simple without any information whatsoever about the "worlds" of God (...*anna jawhar al-insān fī aṣl al-fiṭrah khuliqa khāliyan wa sādhijan lā khabara ma'ahu min 'awālim Allāh ta'ālā*).³ The first perceptive power to develop in man is the sense of touch. After that the sense of

¹*Ihyā'*, 3, pp. 6-7. See *Sharḥ Kitāb 'Ajā'ib al-Qalb*, partial English trans. McCarthy, "Appendix V," chap. in *Freedom and Fulfillment*, *op. cit.*, pp. 368-370; hereafter cited as A5. Cf. *Ma'ārij*, pp. 37-48; *Mizan*, p. 26; and *Kimiya*, pp. 18-19.

²*Ihyā'*, 3, p. 7 (A5, p. 369).

³*Munqidh*, p. 381 (MMD, pp. 96-97). See also his *Kitāb al-Shukr of Ihyā'*; NN, pp. 34 and 121-122; MSTF, pp. 33-35; MS, pp. 167-168; and *Chapter Three*.