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THE APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
IN MALAYSIAN LAND LAW

BY

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In the absence of any express provision in the National Land Code, 1965 regarding the application of English rules of equity in Malaysian land law, it has been the cause of much contraversies. This is due in part to the uncertain reservation effected by section 6 of the Civil Law Act, 1956 and in part to the uncertainty whether equitable principles are applicable under the Torrens System as embodied in the National Land Code, 1965. Therefore, this dissertation discusses the extent to which equitable principles are considered to be applicable under the National Land Code through the light of judicial decissions.

The Second Chapter of the dissertation defines the meaning of equity and discusses the development of the rules of equity in land law. The discussion has been specifically focused in England as that was the place where the rules of equity has been first introduced.

In the Third Chapter, the writer tries to highlight the general concept of the Torrens System which was originated by Sir Robert Richard Torrens in Australia and the attitude of the Torrens System towards the rules of equity.

The Fourth Chapter is the most significant chapter in which it deals with the basic features of the National Land Code, 1965 and its different approach towards the rules of equity from the Torrens System in New Zealand and Australia.

Despite of introduction of registration of title through the Torrens System, the National Land Code does not abolish the customary land law. In fact, land held under customary tenure in Peninsular Malaysia, their continued recognition and preservation are provided for under paragraph (a) of sub-section (2) of section 4 of the National Land Code. The details have been discussed in Chapter Five. This chapter also explains that even though the customary land laws adopted the principle of registration under the Torrens System, some of them were however, subject to the application of English equitable principles especially in jual-janji transactions.

The Sixth Chapter lays down some judicial decisions which are in favour of the application of equitable principles in land dealings in Malaysia, such as ownership, leases, tenancies, charges, and liens.

The equitable reliefs in land dealings have been discussed in the last Chapter. Those remedies are provided in the Specific Relief Act, 1950 (Revised 1974).

The writer has attempted to state all the relevant judicial decisions from both views, those who are upholding that the National Land Code recognises the rules of equity and those who do not with their own arguments.

Deficiencies in this dissertation remain solely the writer's responsibility.

PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY IN MALAYSIAN LAND LAW

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Title page	i
Acknowledgments	ii
Preface	iii
Table of contents	v
Table of cases	viii
Table of statutes	xiii

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1.	Objective of the study	2
1.2.	Scope and Methodology	2
1.3.	Hypothesis	4

CHAPTER 2

THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITY.

2.1.	Definition	5
2.2.	Jurisdiction and Development of equity	7
	2.2.1. Use	9
	2.2.2. The Statute of Uses 1535	10
	2.2.3. Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875	12
2.3.	The Nature of Equitable Rights	14
2.4.	Equitable Interests in Land	18
	2.4.1. The Law of Property Act 1925	21

CHAPTER 3

TORRENS SYSTEM AND EQUITY

3.1.	The Origins of Torrens System	23
3.1.1.	The Cordinal Features of Torrens System	24
3.2.	Equitable Principles under Torrens System	27

CHAPTER IV

EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES AND MALAYSIAN TORRENS SYSTEM

4.1.	Pre-National Land Code	34
4.1.1.	Indefeasibility of Titles	38
4.1.2.	Equitable Principles	41
4.1.3.	Caveatable and Equitable Interests	50
4.2.	Towards National Land Code	53
4.2.1.	Basic Features of the National Land Code	...55
4.2.2.	Equitable Principles under the National Land Code	...57
4.2.3.	Section 6 of the Civil Law Act, 1956.	62

CHAPTER V

CUSTOMARY LAND LAW AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES

5.1.	Definition of Custom	67
5.2.	Malay Customary Law	68
5.2.1.	Malay Customary Land Law	74
5.2.2.	Characteristics of Malay Customary Land Law	...76
5.2.3.	Characteristics of Adat Perpatih in Negeri Sembilan	...80

5.3.	Statutory Provisions	82
5.4.	Customary Land Law and Equitable Principles	86
5.5	Jual-Janji	88

CHAPTER VI

EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES IN LAND DEALINGS

6.1.	General Principles	96
6.2.	<u>Equitable Ownerships</u>	98
6.3.	Equitable leases	100
6.4.	Equitable Charges and Equitable Liens	106

CHAPTER VII

EQUITABLE REMEDIES

7.1.	Specific Performance	111
7.2.	Injunctions	117
7.3.	Damages	122
7.4.	Rectifications	126

CONCLUSION	126
------------	-----

BIBLIOGRAPHY	134
--------------	-----

APPENDIX	138
----------	-----

TABLE OF CASES

	Page
Abigail v. Lapin [1934] A.C. 491.....	30,50
Ahmad Omar v. Haji Salleh [1987] 1 M.L.J. 338	95
Alagappa Chetty v. Ng Guan Yin (1921) 5 F.M.S.L.R. 236	43,46,112
American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] A.C. 396	118,120
Ardeshir Mamma v. Flora Sassoon (1928) A.I.R. 208	124
Arunasalam Chetty v. Teah Ah Poh Trading [1937] M.L.J. 17	107
Assets Company Ltd. v. Mere Roihi (1905) A.C. 176	30
Bachan Singh v. Mahinder Kaur (1956) M.L.J. 97	48
Bahr v. Nicolay (No.2) (1988) 62 A.C.J.R. 268	31
Barry v. Heider (1914) 19 C.L.R. 197	27,32
Boyd v. Mayor Etc of Wellington [1924] N.Z.L.R, 1174 ...	26,31
Breckwar v. Wall (1972) 46 A.L.J.R. 68	26
Breskvars v. Wall (1971)126 C.L.R. 375	29
Brunker v. Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. (11937) 57 C.L.R. 55	28
Burns Philp Trustee Co. Ltd. v. Viney [1981] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 216	20
Butler v. Fairclough [1917] 23 C.L.R. 78	32,33
Chan Swee Kin v. Tang Wooi Yin [1983] 1 M.L.J. 261	119
Central Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Snider [1916] 1 A.C. 266	20
Chin Cheng Hong v. Hamid & Ors. (1954) 20 M.L.J. 169 ...	52
Chin Choy & Ors. Collector of Stamp Duties [1981] 2 M.L.J. 47	62,66
Chong Choong Hoong & Anor. v. Wong Yuen Song [1976] 1 M.L.J. 282	116
City Investment Sdn. Bhd. v. Koperasi Serbaguna Cuepacs Tanggung Bhd. [1985] 1 M.L.J. 285	117
Cohen v. Nessdale Ltd. [1982] 2 All. E.R. 97	112

Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v. Livingstone	
[1965] A.C. 694	21
Craddock Bros v. Hunt [1923] 2 Ch. 136	126
Devi v. Francis [1969] 2 M.L.J. 169	66,103
Datuk Jagindar Singh v. Tara Rajaratnam [1983] 2 M.L.J.	
196	90
Ewing v. Orr Ewing (1883) 9 App. Cas. 334	15
Frazer v. Walker (1967) A.C. 569	26,27,28,29,38,109
Fels v. Knowles (1906) 26 N.Z.L.R. 604	25
Gan Realty Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. [1969] 2 M.L.J. 110	116
Gibson v. Manchester City Council [1979] 1 W.L.R. 294...	112
Hajah Lijah Binti Jamal v. Fatimah Binti Mat Diah [1950]	
M.L.J. 63	79
Haji Abdul Rahman v. Mohamed Hassan [1917] A.C. 209	
.....	41,52,58,90,131
Haji Saemah v. Haji Sulaiman [1948] M.L.J. 108	68
Haji Ramah v. Alpha & Others (1924) 4 F.M.S.L.R. 179 ...	87
Halijah v. Morad [1972] 2 M.L.J. 166	90,94
Harpushad v. Sheo Dyal (1876) L.R. 31A. 259	67
Hassan v. Ismail [1970] 1 M.L.J. 210	116
Hewitt v. Court (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 211	20
Horsler v. Zorro [1973] Ch. 302	125
Hubbard v. Pitt [1975] 3 All. E.R. 10 CA	120
Ibrahim v. Abdullah (1964) 30 M.L.J. 139	92
Inwards v. Baker [1965] 2 Q.B. 29	101
Itam bin Saad v. Chik binti Abdullah [1974] 2 M.L.J. 53.	116

Jasin v. Taiwan (1941) M.L.J. 247	81
Johnson v. Agnew (1950) A.C. 367	125
Karuppiah Chettiar v. Subramaniam (1971) 2 M.L.J. 116 ..	61
Lee Hoy & Anor. v. Chen Chi [1971] 1 M.L.J. 76	125
Lee Sau Kong v. Leow Cheng Chiang [1961] M.L.J. 17	117
Lin Nyuk Chan v. Wong Sz Tsin [1964] M.L.J. 200	116
Lion Laboratories Ltd. v. Evans [1984] 2 All. E.R. 417..	119
Loguc v. Shoalhaven Shire Council (1979) 1 N.S.W.L.E. 537	31
Lord Dudley and Word v. Lady Dudley (1705) Prec. Ch. 241	6
Luk Yim v. Chin Chin (1907) 1 F.M.S.L.R. 74	44
Maani v. Mohamed [1961] M.L.J. 88	70
Maddison v. Alderson (1883) 8 App. Cas. 467	112
Mahadevan & Anor. v. Manilal & Sons (M) Sdn. Bhd. [1984] 1 M.L.J. 266	95,107
Margaret Chua v. Ho Swee Kiew & Ors. [1961] M.L.J. 173 .	102
Mayer v. Coe (1968) 2 N.S.W.R. 747	28
Mercantile Bank v. The Official Assignee (1969) 2 M.L.J. 196	60,107,108
Mohamed v. Ho Wai [1961] M.L.J. 7	111,115
Mohamed Zainuddin bin Puteh v. Yap Chee Seng [1978] 1 M.L.J. 40	121,120
Mok Deng Chee v. Yap See Hoi 7 ors. [1981] 2 M.L.J. 321	105
Mosbert Berhad (In Liquidation) v. Chatib Bin Kari [1985] 1 M.L.J. 162	98
Munah v. Isam [1936] M.L.J. 42	80
Municipal District of Concord v. Coles [1905] 3 C.L.R. 96	32
Murugappa Chetty v. Seenivasagam [1936] F.M.S.L.R. 33 ..	88,93
Nawab v. Mohamed Shariff (1953) 19 M.L.J. 12	92
Ngan Khong v. Banah Binti Pakeh Jamin & Anor. [1935] F.M. S.L.R. 81	107

Oh Hiam and Ors. v. Tham Kong (1980) 2 M.L.J. 159 ..32,61,127	
Ong Chat Pang & Anor. v. Valiappa Chettiar [1971] 1 M.L.J. 105	99
Ong Tin v. The Seremban Motor Garage (1917) 1 F.M.S.L.R. 308	45
Othman & Anor. v. Mek (1972) 2 M.L.J. 158	93
Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) L.R.I.H.L. 129	103
Re Diplock (1948) Ch. 465	5
Re Nisbet and Potts' Contract [1906] 1 Ch. 386	19
Sali binti Haji Salleh v. Achik Alias Bachik bin Enot & Ors. (1918) 1 M.L.J. 14	84
Sahrip v. Mitchell & Anor. (1879) Leic. 466	75
Seet Soh Ngoh v. Venkateswara Sdn. Bhd. [1976] 1 M.L.J. 242	115
Sekemas Sdn. Bhd. v. Lian Seng Co. Sdn. Bhd. (1989) 2 M.L.J: 155	113
Shafi v. Lijah [1949] M.l.J. 65	86
Shaik Abdul Latif v. Shaik Elias Bux [1915] 1 F.M.S.L.R. 204	74
Siah v. Tengku Nong [1964] M.L.J. 43	117
Siew Soon Wah & Ors. v. Yong Tong Hong [1973] 1 M.L.J. 133	101
Southeast Asia Fire Bricks Sdn. Bhd. v. Neo Metallic Mi- neral Products Manufaacturing Employees Union & Ors. (1975) 2 M.L.J. 250	6
Spiro v. Lintern [1973] W.L.R. 1002	111
Steadman v. Steadman [1976] A.C. 536	112
Tan Cheng Hin & Anor. v. Lim Jew Siang & Ors. [1977] 2 M.L.J. 51	121
Temenggong Securities Ltd. & Anor. v. Registrar of Titles Johore [1974] 2 M.L.J. 45	99
Tengku Mariah binte Sultan Sulaiman v. Halimah binte Abdullah [1980] 2 M.L.J. 234	99

The Motor Emporium v. Arumugam (1933) M.L.J. 276 49

UMBC v. Pemungut Hasil Tanah Kota Tinggi Johore [1979] 2
M.L.J. 20263,66,130

Valiappa v. Kesarmal (1951) M.L.J. 17 47

Vallipuram Sivagura v. Palaniappa Chetty [1937] M.L.J.59 107

Venkatachalam Chettiar & Ors. v. Arunasalam Chettiar [1953]
M.L.J. 234 117

Verama v. Amarugam [1982] 1 M.L.J. 107 1

Walsh v. Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch. D. 9 47

Warren v. Tay Say Geok & Ors. (1965) 1 M.L.J. 44 49

Wilkins v. Kannamal (1951) M.L.J. 99 13,47

Williams v. Greatex (1975) 1 W.L.R. 31 94

Wilson v. Mc Itosh (1894) A.C. 129 32

Wong See Leng v. C. Saraswathy Ammal (1954) 20 M.L.J.141 92

Woo Yok Wan v. Loo Pek Chee [1975] 1 M.L.J. 156 65,66

Wroth v. Tyler (1974) Ch. 30 125

Yaacob bin Lebai Jusoh v. Hamisah binti Saad (1950) 16
M.L.J. 254 93

Yeo Long Seng v. Lucky Park Pte. Ltd. [1971] 1 M.L.J. 20
.....114,116

Zahara v. Che Yusuf [1951] 17 M.L.J. 1 90

Zaibun Sa binte Syed Ahmad v. Loh Koon Moy [1982] 2 M.L.J.
92 114

TABLE OF STATUTES

Civil Law Enactment, 1937
Civil Law Act, 1956
Contracts Act, 1956
Customary Tenure Enactment (c. 215 of the revised laws of the
F.M.S. 1935)
Customary Tenure (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 23 of 1949)
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1952)
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Land Transfer Act, 1952
Law of Property Act, 1925

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Mining Enactment, 1904

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National Land Code (Penang & Malacca Titles) Act, 1963
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1898

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C H A P T E R

I

INTRODUCTION

By virtue of the Selangor Registration of Titles Regulations of 1891, Torrens System was introduced in the Malay States to replace the English deeds system in governing land matters. This was later became the model for the other states to follow. In 1965, a uniformity of the system for all states was introduced into one Code, National Land Code, 1965.

One of the reformative roles of the Torrens System is to do away with the dual ownership of land which is "one of the causes of the evils in the English System of conveyancing". The Torrens System further recognises that "the register is everything". An estate or interest in land can only be acquired by virtue of due conformity with the statutory procedure. As *Arulanandom J.* in *Verama v. Amarugam*¹ said:

"in interpreting land laws in this country, one should always bear in mind that land laws are governed by the National Land Code which does not allow the law to be tempered by equity".

However, to what extent this statement stands? It seems that some judges, despite of the "the register is everything" recognise equitable estates or equitable interests.

¹ [1982] 1 M.L.J. 107.

Assignee²:

"It has not been shown that there are express words in the Statute which preclude me from enforcing the equitable rights of the applicants".

These two contradict views become the primary statement of problem in the writer's study.

1.1. Objective of the study

The main objective of this study is to look into the grounds and basis formulated by the judges leading to their different views in applying the equitable principles in Malaysian land law.

1.2. Scope and methodology

The scope of the study will be focussed into four areas.

1. The early doctrine of equity in land law.
2. Equitable principles in the early Torrens System introduced in Australia.
3. Equitable principles in Malaysian Torrens System in the early period pre-National Land Code and after the codification of the National Land Code, 1965. Is there any different attitude of the judges in applying the equitable principles between the two periods?

²

(1969) 2 M.L.J. 169.

4. Examples of the judicial decisions which are in favour of the reception of equity in Malaysian land dealings and the equitable remedies granted by the judges to the persons who are entitled for equitable rights and interests.

This study is mainly based on library research, using the primary legal sources, via, statutes and judicial judgments. From this judicial judgment also, the problem statement was derived whereby the contradict views given by different judges on the same issue had inspired the writer to study and analyse the statutes and cases which have been relied on by those judges, and the interpretation given by them to cause their different conclusions.

The secondary legal materials like books, journals and articles were also referred to, to help in analysing a particular point of law from different perspectives.

The methodology of this study involves three stages;

1. Stating the facts of the problem which has been derived from the judicial decisions concerning the application of the equitable principles in Malaysian land law.
2. Analysing the facts of the problem and determining the legal issues involved.
3. Searching the relevant authorities to support the findings of the analysis.

1.3. *Hypothesis*

1. The registration and indefeasibility of title introduced by the Torrens System do not necessarily mean to remove the equitable principles in land matters.
2. Different interpretation of the statutes, especially the National Land Code, 1965 by the judges resulted to the different opinions in the application of equity in Malaysian land law.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITY

2.1 *Definition*

Early authorities refer equity as 'conscience', 'reason' and 'good faith' as the principles which guide the Court of Chancery, and the term of '*equity*' implies a system of law which is more consonant than the ordinary law with opinion current for the time being as to a just regulation of the mutual rights and duties of men living in a civilised society.³

Equity is a branch of law in the promotion of justice which has been enforced exclusively in the Court of Chancery prior to the coming into force of the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875.⁴ A plaintiff asserting some equitable rights or remedy must show that his claim has "an ancestry founded in history and in the practice and precedents of the court administering equity jurisdiction. It is not sufficient that because we may think that '*justice*' of the present case requires it, we should invent such a jurisdiction for the first time".⁵

³ Words and Phrases Legally Defined, Vol. II, at p. 173

⁴ Repealed and replaced by the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, which was in turn replaced by the Supreme Court Act 1981

⁵ *Re Diplock* (1948) Ch. 465, at p. 481

Equity has been further referred to as a body of rules or principles which form an appendage to the rules of law, or a gloss upon them. This new body of rules is distinguishable from the general body of law, not because it seeks to achieve a different end (for both aim at justice), nor because it appears at a later stage of legal development.⁶

A classic eighteenth century statement by *Lord Cowper* in the case of *Lord Dudley and Word v. Lady Dudley*⁷ is that;

"Equity is no part of law, but a moral virtue, which qualifies, moderates, and informs the rigour, hardness, and edge of the law, and is a universal truth; it does also assist the law where it is defective and weak in the constitution and defends the law from crafty evasions, delusions, and new subtitles, invented and contrived to evade and delude the common law, whereby such as have undoubted right are made remediless; and this is the office of equity, to support and protect the common law from shifts and crafty contrivances against the justice of the law. Equity therefore does not destroy the law, nor create it, but assist it".⁸

⁶ Jill E. Martin, *Hanbury and Maudsley Modern Equity* (13th Edn), London, (1989), at p. 33

⁷ (1705) Prec. Ch. 241, at p. 244

⁸ In Malaysia, see *Southeast Asia Fire Bricks Sdn. Bhd. v. Neo - Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union & Ors.* (1975) 2 M.L.J. 250, at p. 252, *Abdul Hamid J.* said that "Equity...does not destroy the law, nor create it".

2.2 Jurisdiction and Development of Equity

The field of equity is delineated by a series of historical events, and not by a priori theory of plan. At the end of the thirteenth century, a residuum of justice resides in the King as "*fountain of justice*". These petitions were sometimes examined by the King and his council and the relief was granted or refused. Later due to the pressure of business in the council, the petitions were sent to the Lord Chancellor who, as Chief Secretary of the State and "*keeper of the King's conscience*" dealt with them alone. By the end of the fifteenth century, the Chancellor had set up his own court, i.e., the Court of Chancery and dealt with the petitions for relief. The Chancellor was not bound by the writ system or the technical and formal rules of the common law.⁹

Petitions were addressed to the Chancellor in situations in which the petitioner complained that his case was beyond the ordinary mechanism, and he sought another way. The Chancellor was commonly an ecclesiastic, well versed in both the civil and canon law. He will dispense an extraordinary justice remedying the defects of the common law on grounds of conscience and natural justice.¹⁰ The Chancellor would give or withhold relief, not according to any precedent, but according to the effect upon

⁹ C.F. Padfield, *Law Made Simple*, London, (1985), at p. 14.

¹⁰ Philip H. Pettit, *Equity and the Law of Trust* (6th Edn), London, (1969), at p. 4.

his own individual sense of right and wrong by the merits of the particular case before him. It has been said that;¹¹

"Equity is a roguish thing. For law we have a measure ... equity is according to the conscience of him that the Chancellor, and as that is longer or narrower, so is equity. 'Tis alone as if they should make the standard for the measure a Chancellor's foot".

In England, before the Judicature Act of 1873, all branches of equity were ordinarily classified into three headings:¹² the exclusive, concurrent and auxiliary jurisdictions. The exclusive jurisdiction was said to comprise matters in which a court of equity alone had jurisdiction to grant relief, e.g., the enforcement of trust.

The so-called concurrent jurisdiction comprised matters jurisdiction to deal with which was possessed both by the courts of equity and the courts of common law. Thus, a court of equity when granting a decree of specific performance was said to be exercising its concurrent jurisdiction, such as equity had the power to decree specific performance, and law to award damages.

The auxiliary jurisdiction comprised matters in which a court of equity entertained jurisdiction in order to enable parties claiming legal rights the more conveniently or effectively to establish those rights in a court of common law. This included not only cases where a court of equity granted

¹¹ Holdsworth, *History of English Law*, Vol. I, at p. 467 (n.d).

¹² R.P Meagher and W.M.C Gummow, J.R.F Lehane, *Equity, Doctrines and Remedies*, Butterworth Pte. Ltd., London, (1984), at p. 9.